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The Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (the ‘Optional Protocol’ or the ‘OP-ICESCR’) has recently been 
adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations.1 This document establishes 
a new complaints procedure for economic, social and cultural rights (‘ESCR’) within 
the United Nations human rights system. Hence, those rights – as it is already the 
case for civil and political rights (CPR) – will become quasi-justiciable at 
international level. Once the Optional Protocol will enter into force, individuals and 
groups victims of violations of any right contained in the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (the ‘Covenant’ or the ‘ICESCR’) will have 
the possibility to submit communications to the United Nations Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (the ‘Committee’ or the ‘CESCR’), as long as 
the state concerned is party to the OP-ICESCR.2  
 This represents an historic change in the international human rights 
mechanisms landscape as well as an important development in the debate concerning 
the justiciability of economic and social rights (ESR). However, questions remain 
concerning the real impact of such a procedure. Can this new complaint mechanism 
be an efficient way of enforcing ESR throughout the world?  
 In an attempt to answer those questions, it may be useful to look at the 
experience of national jurisdictions having recognised ESR as justiciable. So far, 
only a small minority of countries are in this situation. Among them, South Africa is 
often taken as an example, since it adopted one of the most progressive constitutions 
in the world. The South African Bill of Rights integrates civil and political as well as 
economic, social and cultural rights. Consequently, for thirteen years now, cases on 
ESR have been brought to the South African Constitutional Court (the ‘Court’) – the 
highest judicial body on constitutional matters. Those judgments form a unique 
jurisprudence that can be useful for any entity working in the field of ESR, both at 
national and at international levels.  
 
                                                
1 Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, United 
Nations General Assembly Resolution A/RES/63/117 (2008). 














In this work, I will show that the CESCR’s interpretation of states’ obligations 
regarding ESR developed so far in its general comments fails to take account of 
some important justiciability concerns. Therefore, if the purpose of the OP-ICESCR 
has to succeed, it should adopt a more cautious approach in reviewing individual 
communications. I suggest that the South African jurisprudence on ESR – and 
particularly the reasonableness standard used by the Court – would be a useful model 
for the Committee because it showed the necessary flexibility needed to take account 
of human rights interests and states’ realistic interests.  
 
In order to clarify the subject, I start the discussion by outlining the main concerns 
raised in the justiciability of ESR debate. Then I put the question in its historical 
context by recounting the 18 years process that lead to the adoption of the Optional 
Protocol. This will allow a better comprehension of the challenges to the new 
mechanism. I then look at the main provisions of the OP-ICESCR so as to 
understand the framework they create for the complainants and for the states. In the 
following part, I focus on the Committee’s approach towards states obligations under 
the Covenant and evaluate whether it can be realistically applied in the context of the 
Optional Protocol. Finally, I attempt to show that the South African Constitutional 
Court’s jurisprudence in the landmark ESR cases provides for an appropriate model 
of review that could be taken up by the CESCR when confronted to the new task of 


























2) The debate on the justiciability of economic and social rights 
 
a. Introduction 
The debate on the justiciability of ESR is central to the subject of the present work. It 
is therefore necessary to start by explaining what it is about. Although – on the paper 
– it has been universally accepted that everyone is entitled to ESR,3 no clear common 
understanding has been found on the nature of those rights and, in turn, on what they 
imply and how they can be best implemented. Langford has synthesised the 
questions at the heart of the debate as follows: the issue is ‘whether [ESCR] are legal 
rights and whether courts have the legitimacy and capacity to adjudicate them’.4  
 There is one major reason why it is important to understand this debate for 
the subject I am dealing with here. If it has to be successful, the adjudication of ESR 
has to take into account the justiciability concerns. As I will show in this work, this is 
what the South African Constitutional Court has done,5 and this is why it might serve 
as an example for the Committee.   
 In this chapter, I will first give a definition of the concept of justiciability. 
Then, I will outline the main arguments shaping the debate.    
 
b. The definition of the concept of justiciability  
In broad terms, the concept of justiciability of ESR can be defined as ‘the extent to 
which an alleged violation of an economic or social subjective right invoked in a 
particular case is suitable for judicial or quasi-judicial review’.6 Consequently, if the 
judicial or quasi-judicial body ‘finds a violation, it must be able to provide a remedy 
or redress’.7  
 
                                                
3 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, United Nations General Assembly Resolution A/RES/3/217 
(1948) art 22-25-26. 
4 M Langford ‘The justiciability of social rights: from practice to theory’ in M Langford (ed) Social 
rights jurisprudence: emerging trends in international and comparative law (2008) 29. 
5 E C Christiansen ‘Adjudicating non-justiciable rights: socio-economic rights and the South African 
Constitutional Court’ (2007) 38 (2) Columbia Human Rights Law Review at 321-344. 
6 F Coomans ‘Some introductory remarks on the justiciability of economic and social rights in a 
comparative constitutional context’ in F Coomans (ed) Justiciability of economic and social rights: 














In order to have a better understanding of the concept, it is useful to make the 
distinction between justiciability, enforceability and judicialism.8 Enforceability has 
to do with ‘the identification of the entitlements and duties created by the legal 
regime’, whereas justiciability focuses on the mechanisms that are put in place to 
deal with the non-compliance with the norms established by the legal regime.9 The 
two concepts are closely related to each other as the latter ‘is a direct follow-up to 
the’ former.10  
 The difference between justiciability and judicialism is also quite subtle. 
Judicialism implies a process involving a court. This is not a necessary condition for 
justiciability, as the review can be judicial or quasi-judicial.11  
 
It should also be noted that there are some disagreements on the meaning of the 
concept itself. Dennis and Stewart have attempted to show that, in the debate, all 
sides use the notion ‘in ambiguous ways’.12 They explained that usually, 
governments tend to understand justiciability as to what can be done in their own 
jurisdiction.13 Similarly, the Committee has argued that all the rights in the Covenant 
must be considered as having some justiciable features, and for that reason, ‘states 
parties should provide for judicial enforcement … in their domestic law’.14 On the 
other hand, they noted that scholars and nongovernmental organisations (‘NGOs’) 
consider rights as being justiciable as soon as there is a mechanism or a procedure 
for their adjudication.15 Craven expressed this view when he stated that ‘justiciability 
… depends, not on the quality of the decision, but rather on the authority of the body 
to make the decision’.16  
 I agree with Dennis and Stewart when they say that Craven’s view is limited 
and that a more substantive approach to justiciability should pay attention to the 
obligations of the states, and whether complaints are susceptible to be rationally and 
                                                
8 J K Mapulanga-Hulston ‘Examining the justiciability of economic, social and cultural rights’ (2002) 
6 (4) International Journal of Human Rights 36. 
9 Mapulanga-Hulston op cit (n8) 37. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Dennis and Stewart ‘justiciability of economic, social and cultural rights: should there be an 
international complaints mechanism to adjudicate the rights to food, water, housing and health?’ 
(2004) 98 (3) American Journal of International Law 473. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Dennis and Stewart op cit (n12) 473-474. 
15 Dennis and Stewart op cit (n12) 474. 













meaningfully resolved.17 Therefore, they suggested that ‘[t]he issue of justiciability 
must turn on an assessment about the overall impact of the adjudicator’s decision: 
will adjudication contribute to a practical, useful resolution of the issue at hand, 
which the relevant parties will, in turn, respect and implement?’.18 
 Those are complex questions. The impact of the adjudicator’s decision will 
depend on several factors. In this work, I will focus on the standards of review 
chosen in adjudicating ESR cases. Keeping in mind the subtleties of the definition of 
justiciability, I will use the term in its broad sense, as introduced at the beginning of 
this part. 
 
c. The arguments against the justiciability of economic and social 
rights 
The main challenges to the justiciability of ESR are based on two types of 
arguments: concerns about the nature of the rights per se and concerns about judicial 
review.19 Critics based on judicial review focus on two aspects related to the courts, 
namely their political legitimacy and their institutional competence. They contend 
that courts should not adjudicate on socio-economic issues because ‘[p]olicies on 
ESCR involve taking from one group to give to another and are therefore infinitely 
more contentious than [CPR] policies; the political process is better at coping with 
this than the judicial one’.20 
 
i. The nature of economic and social rights 
The distinction between CPR and ESR finds its origins in the process of adopting the 
two separate Covenants that occurred in the 1950s and 1960s. Leaving aside the 
historical arguments according to which the separation is due to the political and 
ideological tensions of the Cold War, the discussions on the differences between the 
two sets of rights has focused on their legal nature.21 Although the international 
community has recognised the universality, indivisibility, interdependence and 
                                                
17 Dennis and Stewart op cit (n12) 474. 
18 Dennis and Stewart op cit (n12) 475. 
19 Christiansen op cit (n5) 347. 
20 J Cottrell and Y Ghai ‘The role of the courts in the protection of economic, social & cultural rights’ 
in Y Ghai and J Cottrell (ed) Economic, social & cultural rights in practice: the role of judges in 
implementing economic, social & cultural rights (2004) 85. 













interrelatedness of all human rights, as well as the fact that they had to be treated 
equally,22 a gap still exists in the perception of their nature.  
 
One distinction commonly used by opponents of the justiciability of ESR is the 
dichotomy between negative and positive rights. This terminology follows from the 
type of obligation governments have to take in order to respect, protect and fulfil 
human rights. According to this classification, CPR are negative rights because they 
entail negative state obligations. In the traditional view, those rights – like for 
example freedom of expression or due process – are perceived as ‘negative rights 
because they only require that the state refrain from interfering in the individual’s 
exercise of the right’.23 Consequently, their implementation would not have 
important budgetary implications and would not be related to political choices about 
resources allocation.  
 On the other hand, ESR are seen as positive rights because the state has a 
positive obligation to fulfil what they imply.24 The actions the government has to 
take to provide social welfare would have important financial costs, which in turn 
have an incidence on the allocation of resources. Moreover, ESR would be vague, 
imprecise, realisable only progressively and aspirational. On the contrary, CPR 
would be better defined, realisable immediately and justiciable.25  
 
Proponents of the justiciability of ESR have rejected the distinction on several 
grounds. They have argued that both sets of rights give rise to negative and positive 
obligations.26 Scholars have long recognised that ESR entail governments’ actions, 
but also restrain.27 The right not to be subjected to arbitrary evictions illustrates this 
aspect. Similarly, CPR also imply important public expenditure. Examples are the 
right to a fair trial or the right to vote. The South African Constitutional Court 
followed the same reasoning when it recognised that both types of rights would give 
rise to budgetary implications and did not agree with the fact that, because ESR 
                                                
22 Status of the International Covenants on Human Rights: draft optional protocol to the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Commission on Human Rights Resolution 
E/CN.4/1997/105 (1996) annex para 1; Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, World 
Conference on Human Rights, (1993) para 5. 
23 Christiansen op cit (n5) 345. 
24 Ibid. 
25 A Neier ‘Social and economic rights: a critique’ (2006) 13 (2) Human Rights Brief 1. 
26 Langford op cit (n4) at 30-31; Mapulanga-Hulston op cit (n8) at 39-41. 













would almost inevitably entail state expenditures, they should not become 
justiciable.28 The CESCR shared this opinion in its ninth general comment where it 
stated: 
While the respective competences of the various branches of government 
must be respected, it is appropriate to acknowledge that courts are generally 
already involved in a considerable range of matters which have important 
resource implications. The adoption of a rigid classification of [ESCR] which 
puts them, by definition, beyond the reach of the courts would thus be 
arbitrary and incompatible with the principle that the two sets of human rights 
are indivisible and interdependent. It would also drastically curtail the 
capacity of the courts to protect the rights of the most vulnerable and 
disadvantaged groups in society.29 
 
Today, a consensus seems to prevail on the fact that both sets of rights imply 
expenditures. The argument that ESR are of a different nature because their costs are 
higher than CPR is not convincing anymore. As Langford has rightly put, if ‘[ESCR] 
require greater public investment than [CPR] … it is a matter of degree rather than 
substance’.30  
 
Another concern raised by the supporters of the non-justiciability of ESR is that they 
cannot be precisely defined. ‘This line of argument maintains that the content of 
[ESCR] is inherently vague and indeterminate and as such these rights do not lend 
themselves to judicial enforcement.’31 Dennis and Stewart – two of the stronger 
opponents to the adoption of an optional protocol to the ICESCR – suggested that the 
first step before talking about justiciability should be clarifying the rights and 
obligations set forth in the Covenant.32 Justice Langa expressed another point of 
view in stating that ‘the content of these rights is less clearly defined more because 
of their exclusion from the realm of adjudication, than due to an inherent 
vagueness’.33 This implies that making ESR justiciable would permit to clarify their 
content – and more importantly – the content of the respective state duties. Here, I 
agree with Justice Langa that adjudicating ESR cases will help defining them. The 
                                                
28 Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 (CCT 23/96) [1996] ZACC 
26; 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC); 1996 (10) BCLR 1253 (CC) para 78. 
29 The domestic application of the Covenant, CESCR General Comment 9, E/C.12/1998/24, (1998) 
para 10. 
30 Langford op cit (n4) 31. 
31 Mapulanga-Hulston op cit (n8) at 41-42. 
32 Dennis and Stewart op cit (n12) at 465-466. 
33 P Langa ‘Taking dignity seriously. judicial reflections on the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR’ 













advantage is that it allows taking the specific context into account, something that is 
crucial when one talks about state obligations towards socio-economic entitlements.  
 
This brief overview shows that the claim that ESR cannot be made justiciable 
because of their nature has increasingly lost its significance.34 In the justiciability 
perspective, the major difference between ESR and CPR might not be their nature 
but rather their implementation. ESR necessitate the development of an appropriate 
plan ‘rather than the creation of fully individual protection’.35 Therefore, today’s 
debate is rather focused on the role of the courts – or the Committee – and whether 
they have the competence and the legitimacy to adjudicate ESR cases.36 I will now 
expose those concerns, which can be seen, in some cases, as well founded. 
 
ii. Legitimacy 
Judicial review of ESR is situated at the boundary between law and politics. 
Therefore, there are concerns that it might undermine the principle of separation of 
powers, which sees social and economic issues as the preserve of the legislative and 
the executive arenas. According to the critics, ‘there is always a risk that the courts 
may cross the line between indicating failures of policy and priorities and indicating 
so clearly what the priorities ought to be that they are actually making policy’.37   
 
In a democratic system, in order to preserve its independence, the judiciary is not 
elected by the citizens. Therefore, it does not enjoy a political legitimacy and is not 
accountable to the public in the same way as the two other powers.38 In addition, 
social matters are traditionally dealt through the political process because they 
involve decisions about resources allocation; usually courts are not given the 
legitimacy to adjudicate on them. Therefore, according to arguments concerned 
about legitimacy, ‘[t]o view [ESR] as justiciable would necessarily and 
impermissibly intrude on the province of the legislative branch—most glaringly 
                                                
34 Langford op cit (n4) 30; M Pieterse ‘Coming to terms with judicial enforcement of socio-economic 
rights’ (2004) 20 (3) South African Journal on Human Rights 390. 
35 Cottrell and Ghai op cit (n20) 87. 
36 Christiansen op cit (n5) 347. 
37 Cottrell and Ghai op cit (n20) 86. 













when a court overrides a legislative act regarding social welfare and asserts a 
different course of action for the state.’39  
 This opinion is expressed by Aryeh Neier – former director of Human Rights 
Watch and strong CPR advocate – who maintained that ESR necessitate a broader 
redistribution of states resources due to their ‘substantial costs’, contrary to CPR 
which protection only has ‘incidental costs’.40 Therefore, he argued, with its 
consequences on the allocation of resources, the implementation of ESR should stay 
in the realm of politics. Neier claimed that ESR could not be made justiciable 
because courts are not the place for negotiation and compromise and that ‘only the 
political process can handle those questions’.41  
 However, those who – like  Neier – state that the judiciary has not the 
legitimacy to adjudicate on ESR cases because they involve decision on resources 
allocation maybe miss the fact that those concerns could also apply to CPR if it is 
taken into account, as explained earlier, that the latter also necessitate financial 
resources.42  
 
Judicial review also raises questions concerning the kind of democracy that can 
ideally serve the purpose of human rights in general. Pieterse has correctly pointed 
out that it is ‘naive and contrary to the purpose of human rights protection to assume 
that abuses of democratic power may adequately be corrected only by a future 
election, or that the citizenry may not participate in governance in ways other than 
voting in elections’.43 Indeed, majoritarian democratic systems do not always ensure 
that human rights are protected. For example, minority groups might be excluded.44  
These defects of elective democracy are fairly patent. Complementary 
accountability mechanisms are needed to ensure that the effective exclusion 
from elective processes does not result in a denial of human rights. 
Adjudication provides an alternative and important forum in which such 
individuals and groups can have their voice heard.45   
 
Another reason that can be mentioned for encouraging judicial review of ESR is the 
fact that it could create a constructive dialogue about effective policy-making 
                                                
39 Christiansen op cit (n5) 348. 
40 Neier op cit (n25) 1. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Pieterse op cit (n34) 390. 
43 Pieterse op cit (n34) 391. 














between the judiciary, the legislative and the executive.46 In this regards, Justice 
Langa argued that ‘[t]he South African jurisprudence … showcases a constitutional 
dialogue between the different branches of government, which furthers the 
democratic values of openness, responsiveness and accountability, and moves 
towards a re-conceptualisation of the doctrine of separation of powers’.47 
 
Finally, judicial review of ESR does not imply courts making law or policy – as 
some fear – but rather reviewing state’s actions using specific criteria. The question 
as to whether judges might interfere with the tasks of other branches of government 
would only be marginal but this is the issue on which the debate should 
concentrate.48 In countries where ESR are justiciable, courts developed tools to deal 
with the risk of judicial interference. This is the case of South Africa and this is 
precisely the focus of this work.  
 
The debate on legitimacy has mostly centred on national adjudication. With regards 
to international adjudication – and especially in the context of the OP-ICESCR – the 
main objection is related to the principle of state sovereignty.49 Governments do not 
appreciate interference in their domestic affairs. Furthermore, the fact that countries 
find themselves in very different circumstances – politically and economically – is 
considered as being an obstacle to any effort to develop a coherent approach in 
adjudicating ESR at international level. Therefore, domestic political processes 
would be better suited to improve socio-economic situations.50 
 Langford attempted to answer to those concerns. First, he noted that states 
have agreed to give up some degree of sovereignty in committing to international 
human rights obligations and in accepting the supervision of treaty bodies.51 Second, 
he explained that ‘some international human [rights] treaties have given States a 
wide degree of latitude’ and mentioned – as it will be shown later – that the CESCR 
spoke ‘of a “margin of discretion” when it comes to policy choices’.52 Third, he 
observed that ‘international supervisory bodies place strong emphasis on their role in 
                                                
46 Ibid. 
47 Langa op cit (n33) 32. 
48 Langford op cit (n4) 34. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Dennis and Stewart op cit (n12) 467. 














examining the justification for a particular act or omission as opposed to a general 
deliberation on the ideal measure for such a situation’.53 As it will be explained 
below, this is where the reasonableness standard – developed by the South African 
Constitutional Court and integrated in the OP-ICESCR – comes into play in the 
assessment of an alleged violation of human rights. 
 
iii. Competence 
The third concern raised by the opponents to the justiciability of ESR is that the 
judiciary does not have the competence – or the capacity – to deal with socio-
economic issues. Christiansen has summarised the problem of institutional 
competence of the courts as follows:  
[T]he concerns are whether a court or judge has the institutional capability to 
appropriately adjudicate social rights when confronted with a single 
complainant or group (the “plaintiff problem”); to access and review all 
necessary specialized information (the “information problem”); and to 
adequately remedy any violation of the right in view of the limited scope of 
the problem before the court—especially when contrasted with the required 
universality of the solution (the “remedy problem”).54 
 
He went on by explaining that the critics presumably fear that ‘either a court will 
provide a narrow, individualized remedy for the present party only, ignoring the host 
of absent but similarly situated persons, or it will evaluate all claims based on the 
limited (and possibly idiosyncratic) information from a single plaintiff’.55  
 
Concerning the plaintiff problem, there are legitimate worries that a single complaint 
might inadequately frame a larger socio-economic issue.56 This was already 
described by Lon Fuller in the late 1970s as the ‘polycentricity’ phenomenon.57 This 
term describes ‘decisions that affect an unknown but potentially vast number of 
interested parties and that have many complex and unpredictable social and 
economic repercussions, which inevitable vary for every subtle difference in the 
decision’.58 Because of the characteristics of the litigation process, courts are seen as 
                                                
53 Ibid. 
54 Christiansen op cit (n5) 349. 
55 Christiansen op cit (n5) 350. 
56 Christiansen op cit (n5) 351; Langford op cit (n4) 37. 
57 Pieterse op cit (n34) 392; Langford op cit (n4) 36. 












lacking the appropriate skills to deal with polycentric matters.59 The polycentric issue 
‘is the most difficult and the one of the most enduring arguments in the capacity 
debate’.60 However, ‘[w]hile the policentricity of a dispute certainly mandates 
judicial caution and awareness of social consequences of judgements, it cannot 
preclude judicial involvement in social rights matters altogether’.61 Moreover, 
arguments based on the polycentricity tend to oversimplify the problem, caricaturing 
ESR claims in comparison to other legal questions.62 In addition, when adjudicating 
on ESR cases, judges usually take polycentric concerns seriously. This is evidenced 
by the development of legal tests, 63 as for example the reasonableness standard.  
 
Information is an important concern for judges, especially when dealing with social 
matters implying a high level of governmental action.64 Contrary to the legislature, 
which has the capacity to gather all the data needed to implement a policy, the courts 
usually only use the information they receive from the parties.65 It is therefore 
important to ensure that the evidence provided is relevant and unbiased.66 This raises 
the question of the quality of the information given to the courts.67 Moreover, critics 
contend that judges lack the expertise needed to deal with economic or technical 
subjects. This has to be taken seriously given the potential impact courts orders can 
have on the budget of the state.68  
 Nevertheless, one can argue that the degree of expertise needed depends on 
what one expects from courts’ adjudication.  
If their role is not to decide policy and resource allocation but rather to assess 
whether the State (or other actors) have adequately [complied] with their 
legal obligations, then they need not to be “policy wonks”. What is required 
is essentially the exercise of “traditional” judicial competences: “hearing 
from the rights claimants, and other witnesses about the particular situation at 
issue, considering evidence from expert witnesses about the broader policy 
issues, hearing arguments from the parties and, finally, applying the law to 
the facts in a fair and impartial manner.69 
 
                                                
59 Pieterse op cit (n34) 393. 
60 Langford op cit (n4) 36. 
61 Pieterse op cit (n34) 394. 
62 Langford op cit (n4) 36. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Langford op cit (n4) 35. 
65 Christiansen op cit (n5) 351. 
66 Langford op cit (n4) 35. 
67 Christiansen op cit (n5) 351. 
68 Pieterse op cit (n34) 394. 













Furthermore, one can recognise that courts have an advantage on the other branches 
of the government. The information they receive illustrates real and concrete 
situations.70 They ‘can test more effectively the particular implications of abstract 
principles and discover problems the legislature could not forecast’.71 
 
The remedy problem is certainly one of the greatest concerns regarding ESR 
adjudication. The ‘incapacity of courts to formulate just and appropriate remedies 
without usurping legislative authority over budgeting is a fundamental argument of 
justiciability opponents’72 and it might be well-founded. How can it be ensured that 
the decisions of the courts in ESR cases will not negatively impact on governmental 
resources? The ICESCR and the South African Constitutional Court give some 
guidance in this regards. The state must realise the rights progressively using 
available resources. However, both texts stay silent on how this should be 
evaluated.73 Here again, the reasonableness standard might be a useful tool to assess 
the actions of the government, and subsequently, to opt for an appropriate remedy.  
 To come back to the polycentricity issue, it should be added that judges can 
integrate polycentric concerns in crafting a remedy. The judiciary can order that the 
government addresses rapidly the emergency needs of the plaintiffs as well as design 
a plan to solve the general problem.74  
 Finally, I should point out a fundamental difference between national and 
international adjudications with regards to remedies. Whereas, for example, the 
South African Constitution gives a wide authority to the courts in making ‘any order 
that is just and equitable’ when a state conduct has been found unconstitutional,75 the 
CESCR, in the framework of the OP-ICESCR, does not have the power to order 
remedies. Article 9 only allows the Committee to give its views and 
recommendations to the state concerned.76 However, there might not be an important 
substantial difference if one thinks that ‘[i]n the context of [ESCR] adjudication, the 
                                                
70 Langford op cit (n4) 35. 
71 Pieterse op cit (n34) 395. 
72 Christiansen op cit (n5) 352. 
73 Ibid. 
74 Langford op cit (n4) 37. 
75 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, section 172(1). 













remedial effect does not always create a tangible and immediate benefit, but often 
does create guidelines to assist governments in realizing their mandate’.77 
 
To conclude, it is important to stress that most of the arguments against the 
justiciability of ESR raise some valid concerns that have to be taken seriously. This 
is what the South African Constitutional Court has done so far in cases related to 
ESR. On the other hand, the CESCR has – to a certain extent – failed to give enough 
credit to those critics. Now that it will be soon confronted to the quasi-judicial task of 
reviewing complaints of alleged human rights violations, it might find helpful to get 























                                                













3) From the proposal to the adoption of the Optional Protocol to the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: an 18 
years process 
 
a. Two mechanisms for one system: the establishment of the 
distinction between the two sets of rights 
During the negotiations leading to the adoption of the two United Nations covenants 
on human rights,78 the question of a mechanism that would allow individuals to 
lodge complaints about alleged breach of provisions of each document by the 
ratifying states was already debated. Objections to create such a procedure for the 
ICESCR were mostly based on arguments against the justiciability of ESR.79 
Therefore, disagreement about the desirability of including a complaints mechanism 
in a human rights treaty was also one of the reasons for the adoption of two separate 
human rights covenants – one containing CPR and another containing ESCR.  
 The classic view that holds the Cold War ideologies responsible for the fact 
that the UN member states adopted two texts, with two different supervision 
mechanisms, is certainly correct but does not explain everything. It is true that many 
Western countries were the defendants of civil and political liberties, while the 
Eastern bloc was an advocate of socio-economic entitlements. However, as Dennis 
and Stewart attempted to show in their controversial article, there might as well have 
been other reasons for the disagreements.80 For example, it is interesting to note that 
Socialists states firmly set against the idea of having expert committees supervising 
both treaties, whereas the United States and other Western countries were in favour 
of such a solution.81 As Langford pointed out, states responses to the idea of an 
international complaint mechanism for ESCR raised three different types of 
concerns, namely, ‘sovereignty, substantive and procedural concerns’82 – with the 
two latter being expressed in the general debate on justiciability as shown in the 
previous chapter.  
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Some States are sceptical towards any form of international supervision …. 
For other States, substance appears to play a larger role …. Other countries 
… claim they are procedurally constrained by their constitution in which 
types of international supervision they can accept.83  
 
Taking those factors into account, Dennis and Stewart suggested that there were 
actually good reasons explaining why the two sets of rights could not be integrated in 
a single document. They stated that: 
From the outset, and for good reason, [ESCR], unlike [CPR]rights, have been 
defined primarily as aspirational goals to be achieved progressively. The 
drafters of the UDHR and the two Covenants well understood the difficulties 
and obstacles relating to justiciability. The decision to put the two sets of 
rights in different treaties with different supervisory mechanisms was well 
considered, and the underlying reasons for those distinctions and decisions 
appear to remain valid today …. It did reflect an assessment of the practical 
difficulties that states would face in implementing generalized norms 
requiring substantial time and resources.84 
 
The discussions occurring in 1954, during the tenth session of the Commission on 
Human Rights (‘the Commission’), show that no state really envisioned the 
establishment of an individual complaints procedure for ESCR.85 The only initiative 
that came close to it was a French proposal for an optional mechanism that would 
have allowed inter-state complaints on selected ESR.86 But most of the countries 
expressed their strong reluctance for such an option and eventually, France withdrew 
it before it could be voted on.87 
 
Hence, in adopting two distinct human rights treaties, the UN member states 
established a distinction between the two sets of rights. A discrepancy of treatment 
between the ‘two generations’ of rights also materialised in the fact that, contrary to 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (‘the ICCPR’), the ICESCR 
was not adopted together with an optional protocol allowing its supervisory body to 
consider complaints of individuals claiming to be victims of human rights 
violations.88 Consequently, at international level, CPR were made quasi-justiciable, 
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whereas adjudication of ESCR was not possible. States compliance with the ICESCR 
was only supervised through the system of state periodic reporting.89  
 
Another distinction between the two sets of rights had been made concerning the 
bodies that would oversee the treaties. Whereas part IV of the ICCPR establishes the 
creation of the Human Rights Committee as the supervisor of the treaty, part IV of 
the ICESCR gives this task to the Economic and Social Council (‘ECOSOC’).90 The 
major difference was that the members of the Human Rights Committee are 
independent experts serving in their personal capacity, while ECOSOC is composed 
of states representatives.91 The implications of this disparity are important. Contrary 
to independent experts, states representatives operate on a mandate from their 
governments and therefore cannot hold independent opinions.  
 It should also be noted that under article 40(4) of the ICCPR, the Committee 
has the clear obligation to study the reports submitted by the states and then to 
transmit to them its own reports and general comments.92 The ICESCR is vaguer on 
the implementation of its reporting system. It merely requires that ECOSOC has to 
consider states ‘reports on the measures … adopted and the progress made in 
achieving the observance of the rights recognized’ in it.93 The reading of part IV 
hinders the clear identification of which body was given the main responsibility for 
supervision (the ECOSOC or the Commission), and of what would be ‘the nature of 
the scrutiny to be undertaken by the UN bodies’.94  
 Moreover, contrary to the ICCPR, the ICESCR stays silent concerning any 
direct feedback from ECOSOC to the states.95 This flaw gives the impression that the 
reporting system is only one-dimensional and misses one of its important aspects, 
which is its capacity to create a dialogue between the state concerned and the United 
Nations supervisory bodies. Thus, the drafters rather chose to put the emphasis on 
the role of the United Nations specialised agencies in giving recommendations and 
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technical assistance for the implementation of the ICESCR.96 Hence, as Matthew 
Craven argued, neither ECOSOC nor the Commission were actually expected to 
examine states compliance with the Covenant. He explained the problems with this 
supervision system as follows: 
What is clear is that no body has the ability to interpret the Covenant in a 
manner that binds States Parties, and that States are merely under an 
obligation to submit reports at periodic intervals—any further participation in 
the supervisory process is entirely voluntary. Reading between the lines, it 
would appear that what was envisaged was a system in which ECOSOC 
would act as a conduit for the transmission of requests for international 
assistance, both economic and technical. It was not expected that ECOSOC 
would ‘assess’ the State reports, or evaluate State performance with respect to 
the implementation of their obligations under the Covenant.97  
 
This led to the conclusion that the reporting system as provided under the ICESCR 
first lacked clarity on how it was supposed to be conducted and secondly, lacked the 
implementation that would have allowed it to serve its purpose.   
 
Soon after the ICESCR was entered into force, this lack of clarity proved to be an 
obstacle to the implementation of its reporting system.98 For that reason, ECOSOC 
created a new body – the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights – 
responsible for the consideration of the reports submitted by the states.99 The 
Committee has been able to develop its own working methods and turned out to 
become one of the most effective human rights reporting procedures in the United 
Nations system.100 Moreover, the experience gained in considering the reports of the 
states parties allowed it to produce a number of general comments on various topics 
related to the interpretation of the Covenant.  
 
b. A plea for a complaints procedure at the 1993 World Conference on 
Human Rights  
Despite the gains made by the CESCR, human rights advocates still expressed the 
need for a complaints mechanism for the ICESCR. Some of the stronger supporters 
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of the idea – like Philip Alston – were to be found in the Committee itself, whose 
approach was based on the following motivations. First, the Committee argued that 
‘such a procedure was needed to place [ESCR] on an equal footing with [CPR]’.101 
Secondly, the consideration of complaints would enhance the Committee’s ability to 
deal with concrete human rights violations, as it would receive concrete 
information.102 As it has been the case for the Human Rights Committee regarding 
CPR, examining complaints would enable the Committee to develop a body of 
jurisprudence that would in turn permit a better interpretation of the provisions of the 
Covenant.103 Thirdly, governments and domestic courts might take ESCR more 
seriously if they could be adjudicated at international level.104 On the other hand, the 
main arguments against the introduction of an individual complaints mechanism for 
ESCR were still based on the idea that ESCR were not justiciable.105  
 
The CESCR began to take some concrete steps, no later than its first meetings. In 
1990, Philip Alston – then Rapporteur of the Committee – suggested that the 
feasibility of a mechanism that would give the CESCR the ability to receive and 
consider individual or collective complaints should be studied.106 The Committee 
approved and asked him to report on the subject, what he did four times between 
1991 and 1996, as he was then the Chairperson of the Committee.107 In addition, in 
1992, the Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of 
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities on the Realization of Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights also recommended the adoption of such a mechanism.108 The 
following year, at the World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna, the Committee 
made the following statement, calling for the adoption of an optional protocol:  
The Committee believes that there are strong reasons for adopting a 
complaints procedure (in the form of an optional protocol to the Covenant) in 
respect of the [ESCR] recognized in the Covenant. Such a procedure would 
be entirely non-compulsory and would permit communications to be 
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submitted by individuals or groups alleging violations of the rights 
recognized in the Covenant …. Various procedural safeguards designed to 
guard against abuse of the procedure would be adopted. They would be 
similar in nature to those applying under the first Optional Protocol to the 
[ICCPR].109  
 
At the same time, some leading non-governmental organisations (‘NGOs’) active in 
the field of ESR started a campaign in the mid 1980s and presented a draft optional 
protocol at the Conference.110 
 
In the same vein, the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action – the text 
adopted at the Conference – as well as to affirm that ‘[a]ll human rights are 
universal, indivisible and interdependent and interrelated’,111 declared that ‘[t]he 
community must treat human rights globally in a fair and equal manner, on the same 
footing, and with the same emphasis’.112 It thus ‘encourage[d] the Commission on 
Human Rights, in cooperation with the [CESCR], to continue the examination of 
optional protocols to the [ICESCR]’.113  
 
c. The Committee’s Proposal 
In 1996, the CESCR requested Philip Alston to draft an optional protocol.114 A text 
was adopted and submitted to the Commission the same year.115 In its preliminary 
considerations introducing the proposal, the Committee stated: 
That if the principle of the indivisibility, interdependence and interrelatedness 
of the two sets of rights is to be upheld in the work of the United Nations, it is 
essential that a complaints procedure be established under the [ICESCR], 
thereby redressing the imbalance that presently exists.116 
 
Concerning the locus standi, the Committee’s Proposal proposed that 
communications could be received from individuals and groups claiming to be 
victims of a violation or acting on behalf of alleged victims.117 This suggestion is 
broader than what was provided under the first Optional Protocol to the ICCPR 
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(‘OP-ICCPR’), which states that only communications from individuals can be 
considered. However, the CESCR’s ‘expansive approach’118 has been justified by the 
evolving practice of the Human Rights Committee.119 In addition, it proposed a 
provision protecting individuals and groups who would submit a communication 
under the protocol.120 
 
Regarding the scope of the optional protocol – meaning which rights should be 
subjected to the complaints mechanism – the Committee debated the possibility of an 
à la carte approach.121 Such an option would allow states to ‘exclude some rights or 
levels of obligations through either opting in or out’.122 Although divided on the 
matter, a majority of the Committee members preferred a comprehensive approach, 
implying that the states party would have to accept the procedure for all the rights set 
forth in articles 1 to 15 of the Covenant.123 Here again, the Committee opted for ‘an 
inclusive rather than a restrictive approach’.124 According to its analysis, there was 
no good reason to exclude one or more of the rights enshrined in the ICESCR.125 
Nevertheless, it is interesting to note its remark concerning article 1, dealing with the 
right to self-determination:  
The Committee noted, however, that the right to self-determination should be 
dealt with under this procedure only in so far as [ESCR] dimensions of that 
right are involved. It considered that the [CPR] dimensions of the right should 
remain the preserve of the Human Rights Committee in connection with 
article 1 of the [ICCPR].126 
 
As it will be discussed below, the question of the inclusion of the right to self-
determination into the range of the rights subjected to the procedure was a cause of 
disagreement until the very end of the negotiations in April 2008.   
 
On the outcome of the examination of the communications, the proposal stated that 
‘[w]here the Committee is of the view that a State Party has violated its obligations 
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under the Covenant, the Committee may recommend that the State Party take 
specific measures to remedy the violation and to prevent its recurrence’.127 It has to 
be noted that the use of the term ‘specific measures’ is quite bold when one knows 
how eager states are to prevent ‘interference’ in their domestic affairs, and even more 
when it is about socio-economic issues that are closely linked to governmental 
policies. It is not surprising that this wording did not survive the debates of the 
following years.  
 
Additionally, the Committee’s proposal included articles dealing with the 
receivability and the admissibility of the communications,128 the substantiation of the 
complaints,129 interim measures,130 reference to state party and friendly settlement,131 
the examination of the communications,132 the follow-up procedures133 and the rules 
of procedure.134 However, after deliberation, the Committee did not include a 
provision for inter-state complaint.135 
 
In drafting its proposal, the CESCR drew its inspiration from the first OP-ICCPR as 
well as the Human Rights Committee’s experience and practice.136 Therefore, apart 
from the possibility of considering oral information during hearings and the 
possibility of meetings with states to talk about the evolution of a specific situation, 
the text did not include new procedures unfamiliar to the first OP-ICCPR.137 
 
d. A workshop and an independent expert to further the discussion 
In February 2001, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 
(‘OHCHR’) and the International Commission of Jurists (‘ICJ’) organised an 
informal workshop where governments and NGOs were invited to participate in a 
review ‘on the justiciability of economic, social and cultural rights, with particular 
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reference to the draft optional protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights’.138  
 The same year, the Commission and ECOSOC appointed Professor Hatem 
Kotrane as independent expert whose mandate was the examination of the question 
of a draft optional protocol.139 After having studied the Committee’s proposal as well 
as the conclusions of the OHCHR-ICJ workshop and consulted several governments, 
the expert submitted his first report to the Commission.140 As Dennis and Stewart 
explained, the independent expert’s initial report contained some doubts concerning 
the readiness of the member states to adopt an optional protocol given the degree of 
opposition that the issue still encountered.141 When he expressed his position on the 
justiciability of ESCR, he referred to the two different types of obligations for the 
states, namely an obligation of result for CPR and an obligation of means (ie, 
conduct) for ESCR, and asked how the latter could be measured.142 However, it must 
be noted that the expert’s analysis is inconsistent with the Committee’s view 
according to which ESCR imply both obligations of conduct and result.143 Mr 
Kotrane also made a recommendation ‘that the complaints mechanism be limited to 
“situation revealing a species of gross, unmistakable violations of or failures to 
uphold any of the rights set forth in the Covenant”’.144 Despite the fact that his first 
report concluded that a working group should not be created immediately, the 
Commission chose that option.145 
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e. The Open-Ended Working Group to consider options regarding the 
elaboration of an optional protocol to the ICESCR 
In April 2002, the Commission decided to create ‘an open-ended working group of 
the Commission with a view to considering options regarding the elaboration of an 
optional protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights’.146 Although it was initially supposed to meet only once, its mandate was 
extended twice, allowing it to meet five times between February 2004 and April 
2008, under the chairmanship of the Portuguese Catarina de Albuquerque.147 During 
the first session of the working group in 2004, the debates concentrated mostly on 
the justiciability of ESCR.148 The question was ‘whether and to what extent [ESCR] 
are able to be adjudicated under a complaints procedure to ICESCR, and whether the 
proposed optional protocol would enhance the protection of [ESCR]’.149 It was 
reported that: 
A number of delegations made reference to case law from national and 
regional courts and argued that the fact that [ESCR] were already adjudicated 
upon by some courts demonstrated that these rights could in principle also be 
subject to a complaints procedure under ICESCR. Conversely, other 
delegations argued that a complaints procedure would be inappropriate 
because of the particular character of [ESCR].150  
 
On the nature of the rights set forth in the Covenant:  
A number of delegations argued that the provisions of ICESCR were imprecise 
and consequently did not lend themselves to adjudication under a complaints 
procedure. Other delegations maintained that the provisions were sufficiently 
precise to allow for a complaints procedure, arguing that the provisions of 
ICESCR cannot be spelled out in more detail as they are context-dependent and 
subject to interpretation in the light of particular situations.151 
 
The report of the working group’s first session shows that the discussions could not 
focus on the elaboration of a protocol while there were still strong opposing views on 
the general question of ESCR justiciability. Unsurprisingly, not having managed to 
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find a consensus on whether to start the process of drafting, the working group asked 
for an extension of its mandate.152 
 
At its second meeting, in an attempt to be more effective and to direct the discussion 
on the content of an optional protocol, the working group gave its chairperson the 
responsibility to submit a document containing the elements that would shape the 
procedure.153 Ms de Albuquerque presented the requested document entitled 
‘Elements for an optional protocol to the [ICESCR]’ at the third session of the 
working group in February 2006.154  
 The Elements Paper – as it has been called – analysed the features of a 
communications procedure, taking into account issues like the scope of rights that 
should be subjected to the mechanism, the admissibility criteria and the standing – 
namely who may submit a communication – the proceedings on the merits, the 
question of friendly settlement of disputes and interim measures.155 It also looked 
into the questions of the inquiry procedure and the inter-state procedure.156 In 
addition, it studied several points that required particular attention like the 
consequences of an optional protocol on the domestic decisions on resource 
allocation, the relationship of an optional protocol with existing procedures on the 
international level and the question of duplication of mechanisms, the issue of 
international cooperation and assistance, the question of the costs of an optional 
protocol, what it would mean not to adopt an optional protocol and the question of 
the impact of an optional protocol on improving implementation of ESCR at the 
national level.157  
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In its third session, the working group used the Element Paper as a basis for the 
discussion.158 This allowed it to address concretely the very issues that had to be 
taken into account. Concerning the scope of the optional protocol, a majority of 
delegations expressed themselves in favour of a comprehensive approach.159 The 
proposal for allowing the supervisory body ‘to request interim measures of 
protection from the State to prevent irreparable harm to the alleged victim’ in some 
exceptional cases also found important support.160 The question of an inquiry 
procedure still raised a lot of doubts as a significant number of delegations stated that 
they had not taken a final position on the matter.161 Regarding the consequences of 
an optional protocol on the domestic decisions on resource allocation, ‘the issue of 
the standards and criteria the Committee would use in determining whether resource 
allocations complied with the Covenant’162 raised concerns among the delegations. 
One of the suggestions that had been made was the application of a ‘standard of 
reasonableness’ in considering states actions.163  
 The result of the third session was that many delegations started to consider 
the drafting of the protocol as the next step.164 As the report reads: 
A clear majority of delegations noted that considerable progress had been 
made in clarifying various questions relating to an optional protocol. In their 
view, the Working Group had fulfilled the mandate assigned to it by the 
[Commission] and could no longer make significant progress without 
engaging in a drafting exercise.165 
 
In June 2006, the newly created Human Rights Council (the ‘Council’ or the ‘HRC’) 
expressed the same view and gave the green light to start the drafting process. 
Resolution 1/3 stated that: 
The Human Rights Council, … [d]ecides to extend the mandate of the 
Working Group for a period of two years in order to elaborate an optional 
protocol to the [ICESCR] and, in this regard, requests the Chairperson of the 
Working Group to prepare, taking into account all views expressed during the 
sessions of the Working Group on, inter alia, the scope and application of an 
optional protocol, a first draft optional protocol, which includes draft 
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provisions corresponding to the various main approaches outlined in her 
analytical paper, to be used as a basis for the forthcoming negotiations.166 
 
The draft prepared by the chairperson and its explanatory memorandum were 
presented to the working group at its fourth meeting in July 2007.167 The debates 
were conducted following the structure of the text, article by article.168 This enabled 
the working group to deepen the discussion concerning the following subjects: the 
criteria to be used by the Committee in examining the communications; the scope of 
the protocol; the question of international assistance and cooperation and the 
establishment of a fund; the admissibility criteria; the issue of interim measures; and 
the possibility of friendly settlement.169 
 
Taking into account what had been said in the course of the fourth session, Ms de 
Albuquerque prepared a revised draft optional protocol that she submitted to the 
working group during the first part of its fifth session, held in February 2008.170 
Although the text was thoroughly reviewed, the participants could not find a 
compromise on the fundamental issues of the standing, the scope, the review criteria, 
the reservations and the question of international cooperation and assistance.171  
 A second revised draft was submitted in the second part of the fifth session of 
the working group, held from 31 March to 4 April 2008.172 The text attempted to 
reproduce the proposals that obtained the broader support from the members of the 
working group.173 In her letter introducing the revised draft, Ms de Albuquerque 
expressed her hope that this last version would allow the finalisation of the 
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negotiations.174 But, as she pointed out, agreement still had to be found regarding the 
question of the rights that should be subjected to the complaints procedure, the 
question of the examination of the steps taken by the state party through a 
reasonableness test, and the question of a trust fund to assist submission of 
communications and to provide expert and technical support to governments and 
NGOs for the implementation of ESCR.175 Informal consultations and negotiations 
between the regional groups finally led to a consensus, although there were still 
opposing views, notably on the fact that the right to self-determination figuring in 
part I of the Covenant was excluded from the rights subjected to the procedure.176 A 
majority of delegations recognised the text as the best compromise and on the 4th of 
April 2008 – the last day of its fifth session – the working group took the decision to 
submit the text for approval to the HRC.177 
 
f. The adoption of the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR 
The Council examined the draft optional protocol during its eighth session, in June 
2008.178 Unsurprisingly, the exclusion of the right to self-determination contained in 
part I of the ICESCR still raised concerns for some delegations and consequently, the 
debate on the scope of the optional protocol went on until a compromise was 
found.179 The last version of the draft did not discriminate any rights enshrined in the 
Covenant.180  
The revised text did not explicitly include Part I within the scope of the OP-
ICESCR, but reference to Parts I, II and III were replaced by more generic 
(and arguably very vague) wording, specifying that complaints could be 
brought before the Committee in relation to ‘any of the [ESCR] set forth in 
the Covenant’.181 
 
The HRC finally agreed on the revised text, which was adopted without a vote on the 
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18th of June 2008.182 Recommendation was made to the General Assembly so that 
the optional protocol could be adopted.183  
 
It was on the significant day of the 10th of December 2008 – which marked the 60th 
anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights – that the General 
Assembly unanimously adopted the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR.184 The will to 
adopt the text on the day of this historic commemoration ‘partly explains the late 
surge in efforts to complete the drafting of the protocol’.185 According to what had 
been recommended, the text had been opened for signature at the United Nations 
Treaty Event in September 2009.186 Twenty-nine countries – principally from Africa, 
Europe and Latin America – signed the text during the ceremony.187 By this act, the 
signatory countries expressed their interest in becoming party to the OP-ICESCR. 
For those countries, the next step should be the ratification of the text. The Optional 
Protocol will enter into force once ten states party to the ICESCR will have ratified 
or acceded to it.188  
 
The length and the content of the discussions that led to the adoption of the Optional 
Protocol are certainly good indicators to the challenges that will still have to be 
overcome, now that the text has been accepted by the General Assembly. Before 
focusing on some of those issues and in order to have a better understanding of the 
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4) The provisions of the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
 
a. Introduction 
The OP-ICESCR represents an important step forward in terms of ESCR protection 
as it creates a new complaints procedure allowing ESCR to become quasi-justiciable 
at international level. It gives to the CESCR ‘the competence … to receive and 
consider communications’.189 This has to be seen as a very positive development.  
Undeniably, more than merely acknowledging that ESCR are equal to CPR, it 
provides a concrete tool for victims of ESCR violations. However, as the previous 
chapter explained, the adopted text is the result of a compromise between two kinds 
of interests: human rights protection interests and states realist interests. This is 
obvious when one looks at the limitations to the procedure included in numerous 
final provisions. Moreover, although other existing instruments have inspired the 
content of the Optional Protocol,190 it also includes some novelties.  
 
In this chapter, I outline the main articles of the Optional Protocol in order to have a 
better comprehension of the framework they create for individual and groups 
complaints. I will sometimes go back to the discussions that occurred during the 
drafting process as they give some insight to understand the purpose of the 
provisions. After looking briefly at the preamble, I will discuss the standing and the 
scope of the procedure, the admissibility criteria for the communications, the 
question of interim measures, the examination of the communications by the 
Committee, the follow-up to the views of the Committee, the inter-state procedure, 
the inquiry procedure and the question of international assistance and cooperation.   
 
b. The preamble 
Although the preamble could be seen as a mere declaration without effect, it is 
necessary to look at it because it expresses the reasons for the adoption of the 
Optional Protocol.  
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 First of all, it must be noted that the preamble of the OP-ICRESCR is much 
more developed that the one of the OP-ICCPR. It starts by making reference to the 
United Nations Charter as well as to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
recalling the fundamental values of dignity, equality, freedom – including freedom 
from fear and want – justice, peace and non-discrimination.191  
 It also reaffirms ‘the universality, indivisibility, interdependence and 
interrelatedness of all human rights and fundamental freedoms’,192 as expressed in 
the 1993 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action. 
 Finally, it takes up Article 2(1) of the ICESCR, which sets out governments 
obligations towards ESCR. It states: 
[T]hat each State Party to the [ICESCR] undertakes to take steps, individually 
and through international assistance and cooperation, especially economic 
and technical, to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to 
achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the 
Covenant by all appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of 
legislative measures.193 
 
Through the diction of the preamble, the Optional Protocol is reaffirming the United 
Nations commitment regarding ESCR. But it also recognises that, in order to ‘achieve 
the purposes of the Covenant and the implementation of its provisions’,194 a 
mechanism of individual complaints would be necessary. 
 
c. Article 2: Communications – the standing and the scope of the 
procedure 
Article 2 deals with the standing – meaning who is entitled to submit a complaint – 
and the scope – meaning which rights are subject to the communications procedure. 
It reads: 
Communications may be submitted by or on behalf of individuals or groups 
of individuals, under the jurisdiction of a State Party, claiming to be victims 
of a violation of any of the [ESCR] set forth in the Covenant by that State 
Party. Where a communication is submitted on behalf of individuals or 
groups of individuals, this shall be with their consent unless the author can 
justify acting on their behalf without such consent.195  
 
                                                

















This means that one single person can send a communication to the Committee about 
her or his own situation. The same applies to groups of individuals. One additional 
important feature is that not only direct victims – be they individuals or groups – can 
bring a complaint, but also people acting on their behalf. This is a broader approach 
than the one adopted in the first OP-ICCPR.196 But even for this procedure, it is not 
new in practice as the Human Rights Committee’s rules of procedures already 
enabled it.197  
 The possibility to lodge a complaint on behalf of the victims is an important 
tool for national and international NGOs. Moreover, victims of socio-economic 
violations are usually marginalised and, for reasons related to costs and access to 
information, would not be able to contact the CESCR without the help of an 
intermediary. However, ‘the final text does not grant standing to NGOs to file 
communications in their own right: they may do so only on behalf of individuals or 
groups of individuals claiming to be victims’.198 This implies that organisations must 
base their submissions on concrete cases. They cannot, in their own names, take up a 
situation of ESCR violations and denounce it via a communication to the Committee 
using the mechanism put in place by the Optional Protocol. But this does not prevent 
them from encouraging victims to use the procedure and, in the case the latter are 
willing to, to submit a complaint on their behalf and based on their stories.  
 
Concerning the standing, it should also be pointed out that the adopted text does not 
allow for collective complaints, as it is for example provided in the European Social 
Charter.199 Such an option had been envisaged in the first versions of the text, but the 
working group decided to exclude it.200 This would have enabled certain 
organisations to submit communications directly.201 As collective actions are not 
mentioned, the Committee might have to clarify the conditions for the submission of 
complaints sent by groups or on their behalf. Questions like what constitutes a group 
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– for example, does a trade union constitute a group202 – or how an organisation can 
represent a group will have to be addressed.  
 
In relation to the scope of the new procedure, Article 2 states that communications 
can be submitted concerning ‘a violation of any of the [ESCR] set forth in the 
Covenant’.203 The consequence of this comprehensive approach might mean that 
fewer states would ratify the text. However, during the drafting process: 
This approach was partly ‘evidence-based’ given the many presentations that 
demonstrated that a wider range of the Covenant obligations and rights had 
been adjudicated in various national and regional jurisdictions. There was 
also a concern that an ‘a la carte’ approach could lead to a hierarchy of rights 
and obligations.204 
 
As mentioned earlier, the most contentious point regarding the scope was possibly 
the inclusion of the right to self-determination in the set of rights subjected to the 
OP-ICESCR. The compromise that had been reached in the final wording implies 
that civil and political dimensions of the right to self-determination are excluded 
from the rights covered by the protocol.205 Therefore, when addressing complaints 
involving violations of that right, the Committee will have to limit itself to its 
economic, social and cultural aspects. 
 
d. Article 3 and 4: Admissibility 
The admissibility criteria under the OP-ICESCR clearly express the wish to limit the 
number of complaints. Whereas some limitations are justified, other might turn out to 
be too restrictive and even counterproductive in terms of human rights protection. 
This is why the admissibility conditions under the Optional Protocol have been 
qualified as a ‘watershed in terms of stringency’.206 While classic criteria of 
admissibility have been taken up from other mechanisms, others have been added. 
According to the conditions already used under other instruments, a communication 
should be considered inadmissible when: 
                                                
202 Mahon op cit (n122) 634. 
203 OP-ICESCR art 2. 
204 Langford op cit (n79) 20. 
205 Ibid. 













• All available domestic remedies have not been exhausted, unless those are 
unreasonably prolonged;207 
• The alleged violation occurred before the entry into force of the Optional 
Protocol for the state concerned unless it continued after that date;208 
• It has already been or is being examined by the Committee or ‘another 
procedure of international investigation or settlement’;209 
• ‘It is incompatible with the provisions of the Covenant’;210 
• ‘It is manifestly ill-founded [or] not sufficiently substantiated’;211 
•  ‘It is an abuse of the right to submit a communication’;212 
• ‘It is anonymous or not in writing’.213 
 
Besides those conditions, Article 3 sets out new criteria for admissibility that might 
well prevent a certain number of cases to be eligible for consideration. They state 
that a communication should be considered inadmissible by the Committee when: 
• ‘It is not submitted within one year after the exhaustion of the domestic 
remedies’ unless it is demonstrated that it was not possible to do so;214 
• ‘It is exclusively based on reports disseminated by the mass media’.215 
 
The one-year time limit criteria clearly shows a new restrictive approach in terms of 
admissibility. ‘This temporal requirement is likely to have a choking effect on claims 
in countries where the new Optional Protocol is not well known or promoted’.216 
Indeed, if victims are not aware of their possibilities under the OP-ICESCR early 
enough, they might not be able to lodge a complaint in time. Gathering all the 
necessary elements in order to send a communication to the Committee might well 
take few months. Moreover, the exact moment when the domestic remedies have 
been exhausted might also be difficult to identify. Therefore, this criterion might 
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have undesirable repercussions on victims of ESCR violations. I would suggest that 
the Committee does not take it in a too rigid manner so as to allow some flexibility 
depending on the cases. 
 
Another limitation is to be found in Article 4, which introduces the new condition of 
‘clear disadvantage’ in the evaluation of the admissibility of a complaint. It states 
that ‘[t]he Committee may, if necessary, decline to consider a communication where 
it does not reveal that the author has suffered a clear disadvantage, unless the 
Committee considers that the communication raises a serious issue of general 
importance’.217 It means that the CESCR will have to consider, long before the 
reviewing stage, whether or not the situations presented to it show that the 
complainants have clearly and significantly suffered a disadvantage. If the 
Committee finds that this factor is not present, the concerned case may be declared 
inadmissible.  
 
The condition of ‘clear disadvantage’ raises several problems. First, it is pretty vague 
wording and the absence of criteria to decide which situation should or should not be 
considered as revealing a clear disadvantage might prevent the Committee to adopt a 
uniform approach when deciding on the admissibility of the complaints.218 In 
certainty, the terms ‘clear disadvantage’ and ‘serious issue of general importance’ 
lack clarity. The Committee will have to define them and resolve questions such as 
how to differentiate a ‘clear disadvantage’ from an ‘unclear disadvantage’ and how a 
‘serious issue of general importance’ can be appreciated.  
 Secondly, Article 4 raises some concerns that might well short circuit the 
examination of the complaints, as it requires the Committee to evaluate the merits of 
the cases before deciding on their admissibility.219  
 Thirdly, this condition seems ‘to imply that some violations could be 
considered insignificant’, which is unacceptable.220 One might have the impression 
that the Committee will have to assess situations presented to it according a threshold 
of suffering. The danger is that it can lead to rank ESCR violations according to a 
degree of suffering, forgetting that any violation is illegal and should never occur. 
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Therefore, because Article 4 ‘could lead to the dismissal of worthy complaints’, it 
would ‘be advantageous to let cases move automatically to the merits stage where 
the actual impact could be properly interrogated’.221 
 
The reason why Article 4 has been integrated has been explained by ‘(an unfounded 
or at least unproven) correlation being made between the fact that there are many 
millions of people living in poverty and deprivation, and the possibility or likelihood 
that such circumstances would give rise to the lodging of an individual complaint’.222 
This provision was therefore seen ‘as a valve for the Committee to control what 
some feared could be a flood of frivolous or undeserving cases’.223 It is actually a 
shame that this view has prevailed as nothing supports such speculations about the 
number of communications that will be sent to the CESCR. On the contrary, an 
overview of the caseload under other human rights instruments showed that other 
treaty bodies actually did not receive a large amount of communications.224 
 
e. Article 5: Interim measures 
Article 5(1) reads: 
At any time after the receipt of a communication and before a determination 
on the merits has been reached, the Committee may transmit to the State 
Party concerned for its urgent consideration a request that the State Party take 
such interim measures as may be necessary in exceptional circumstances to 
avoid possible irreparable damage to the victim or victims of the alleged 
violations.225  
 
The inclusion of a provision allowing for interim measures follows the development 
that has been witnessed in recent complaints mechanisms such as the OP-
CEDAW.226 This is also in line with the Human Rights Committee’s practice and the 
rules of procedures of the Committee against Torture and the Committee on the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination.227 In the case of the OP-ICESCR, the 
importance that such measures might play in cases of violations of ESCR might have 
convinced that they should be dealt with directly in the protocol. Several states and 
                                                
221 Scheinin and Langford op cit (n216) 110. 
222 Mahon op cit (n122) at 635-636. 
223 Scheinin and Langford op cit (n216) 110. 
224 Dennis and Stewart op cit (n12) 508. 
225 OP-ICESCR art 5(1). 
226 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women, United Nations General Assembly Resolution A/RES/54/4 (1999) art 5. 













NGOs argued that ‘[t]he function of interim measures to prevent irreparable harm 
was of such importance that the matter should not be deferred to the Committee’s 
rules of procedure’.228  
 
However, one point that remains unclear concerning interim measures is whether 
they are legally binding or not. While some states consider them authoritative, others 
argue that given the quasi-judicial nature of the complaints procedure, decisions 
taken by the Committee could not be legally binding.229 Here it is useful to note that 
the Human Rights Committee – having already discussed this issue – stated that its 
non-judicial nature did not impair the fact that its views carried ‘some important 
characteristics of a judicial decision’.230 A kind of consensus was found in the OP-
ICESCR where it is stated that interim measures could only be requested in 
exceptional circumstances.231  
 
f. Article 8: Examination of communications 
According to article 8, the CESCR ‘shall examine communications received … in 
the light of all documentation submitted to it’232 and this has to be conducted in 
closed meetings.233 Moreover  
[w]hen examining a communication … , the Committee may consult, as 
appropriate, relevant documentation emanating from other United Nations 
bodies, specialized agencies, funds, programmes and mechanisms, and other 
international organizations, including from regional human rights systems, 
and any observations or comments by the State Party concerned.234 
 
Besides those procedural aspects, article 8 sets out how the Committee should 
evaluate the complaints. Article 8(4) reads: 
When examining communications under the present Protocol, the Committee 
shall consider the reasonableness of the steps taken by the State Party in 
accordance with Part II of the Covenant. In doing so, the Committee shall 
bear in mind that the State Party may adopt a range of possible policy 
measures for the implementation of the rights set forth in the Covenant.235  
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This provision has to be read together with article 2(1) of the Covenant, which 
establishes the obligations of governments regarding ESCR. Its first part introduces 
the reasonableness approach, as developed by the South African Constitutional Court. 
According to this standard of review, when considering a complaint, the CESCR will 
have to assess whether states actions had been reasonable. The second part of the 
provision implicitly recognises that states enjoy a margin of discretion – or 
appreciation – in the adoption of policies affecting ESCR.236   
  The practical implications of article 8(4) will be dealt with in chapter V 
where I will speak about the Committee’s interpretation of states obligations, and in 
chapter VII when analysing South African jurisprudence on the subject. Here, I will 
only give some elements that will help clarifying the reasons for the inclusion of this 
provision in the Optional Protocol.     
 
Article 8(4) results from a discussion that touched the core of the justiciability 
debate. It is an attempt to give guidance as to how the CESCR will have to assess 
whether states have violated their obligations. As Mahon explained:   
Concerns about the Committee's potential over-involvement in policy setting 
prompted a desire to curtail this through the inclusion of criteria in the text of 
the OP-ICESCR, which would guide the Committee as to the standard it was 
to apply when undertaking its consideration of the merits of the claim.237  
 
During the drafting process, other standards have also been discussed. For example, 
the doctrine of a ‘broad margin of appreciation’ has also been proposed as a criterion 
of review, as well as a standard of ‘unreasonableness’ instead of a standard of 
reasonableness.238 But the favoured option had been a combination between the 
reasonableness standard of review and the principle of margin of discretion. States 
who are still sceptical to the idea of the Optional Protocol see it ‘as a way of 
preventing inappropriate or unnecessary incursions into policy choices or resource 
allocation decisions’.239 On the other hand, those who militated for a comprehensive 
and effective instrument consider it as ‘a standard of review that had been proven 
effective at the domestic level’, like in South Africa.240 As a matter of fact, it is 
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significant to note that the South African Constitutional Court’s decision in 
Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others 
(Grootboom)241 has inspired the actual wording of article 8(4). It is in this landmark 
case that the Court used the reasonableness test for the first time and stressed the 
necessity ‘to recognise that a wide range of possible measures could be adopted by 
the state to meet its obligations’.242  
 
g. Article 9: Follow-up to the views of the Committee 
Article 9 provides direction as to what happens once the CESCR has examined a 
communication. A comprehensive written dialogue between the Committee and the 
state concerned is envisaged. First, the Committee must transmit its views and 
recommendations to the parties concerned.243 Then, the state has six-months to send 
its written answer to the Committee.244 Finally, the CESCR may request that the state 
submit further information in its subsequent reports.245 It must be stressed that being 
a quasi-judicial body, it does not have the capacity to deliver legally binding 
decisions, but only views and recommendations. The impact of the decisions taken in 
the framework of the Optional Protocol will depend on the good will of the states 
concerned, as it is the case with other complaints procedures at the United Nations 
level. However, the development of a new and rich jurisprudence should not be 
underestimated. This will hopefully have a positive impact on the progressive 
realisation of ESCR. 
 
h. Article 10: Inter-State communications 
It is worth noting that the Optional Protocol includes a provision for a voluntary 
inter-state communications, whereas this option, figuring in other complaints 
mechanisms, has remained unused so far.246 However, the fact that this traditional 
provision is part of the new instrument can be seen as a positive aspect when one 
thinks about the possible development of the international human rights complaints 
procedures. As Mahon explained: 
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The inclusion of this provision is indeed a positive retention, as not only does 
it ensure that for the sake of any potential future unification of the treaty body 
communications procedures there is no significant gap when it comes to 
inter-State justiciability of human rights, but also it leaves open the door for 
possible developments in international jurisprudence in this regard.247 
 
Thus, thanks to article 10 of the Optional Protocol, ESCR will not be left apart if the 
inter-state communications procedure has to develop in the future.  
 
i. Article 11: Inquiry procedure 
According to the inquiry procedure, a state who declares that it recognises the 
competence of the CESCR provided for under article 11 will have to cooperate in the 
examination of any reliable information alleging that it has gravely or systematically 
violated any ESCR set forth in the Covenant.248 In that context, the Committee can 
decide to conduct an inquiry, which may include a visit to the territory of the state 
concerned. However, such a visit is subjected to the consent of the state.249 The 
findings, comments and recommendations of the Committee shall be transmitted to 
the state concerned, who, in turns, has six months to submit its observation to the 
CESCR.250 The results of the proceedings and the measures taken by the state in 
response to an inquiry can be included in the Committee’s annual report and the 
state’s report respectively.251 
 
The possibility of an inquiry procedure is not new as it was already included in other 
mechanisms such as the OP-CEDAW.252 Like the inter-state communication 
procedure, the inquiry procedure under the OP-ICESCR is an opt-in procedure, 
meaning that the state has to express its consent for it to be applicable.  
 
If it is used in an appropriate manner, such a procedure has the potential to play a 
positive role in the international protection of human rights. It could allow ‘a 
response to be made to serious violations in a timely manner’253 and ‘could be used 
by individuals and groups facing difficulties in accessing the communication 
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procedure or in danger of reprisal’.254 Moreover, it could be a useful tool for NGOs 
who cannot submit communications in their own names. Under article 11, they could 
transmit information regarding any ESCR violation occurring in a country, which 
would have consented to the inquiry procedure. This information could then be used 
by the Committee to conduct an inquiry. 
 
j. Article 14: International assistance and cooperation 
Article 2(1) of the Covenant provides that states parties have the obligation ‘to take 
steps, individually and through international assistance and co-operation, especially 
economic and technical … with a view to achieving progressively the full realization 
of the rights recognized in the present Covenant’.255 It is on this basis that a number 
of states – most of all from Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean – have stressed 
the need to include a provision that would express a corollary duty in the OP-
ICESCR.256 Thus, article 14 states that the Committee can transmit ‘to United 
Nations specialized agencies, funds and programmes and other competent bodies, its 
views or recommendations concerning communications and inquiries that indicate a 
need for technical advice or assistance’.257 
 
Moreover, article 14 provides for the establishment of a trust fund ‘with a view to 
providing expert and technical assistance to States Parties … for the enhanced 
implementation of the rights contained in the Covenant’.258 During the drafting 
process, several Western states were opposed to this provision on the basis ‘that such 
a fund would duplicate existing funds and that it would send a wrong signal that non-
compliance with the Covenant rights could be justified by a lack of international 
assistance’.259 Those arguments were rejected as the fund was seen as giving effect to 
the legal obligation contained in article 2(1) of the ICESCR.260 Moreover, it was 
argued that ‘developing countries did not seek to detract from their obligations, and 
that shared efforts were required, as developing countries could not fully realize 
Covenant rights without international assistance, which was mandated by the 
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Covenant and the Charter of the United Nations’.261 One question that remains is 
















































The impact of the Optional Protocol will depends on a number of aspects, from 
technical and practical to conceptual matters. But what will be definitely critical is 
how the Committee will assess states’ compliance with ESCR. Under the ICESCR, 
the obligations of the states for the implementation of the rights appear in article 
2(1).262 The present chapter will look at the Committee’s understanding of states 
obligations towards ESR. For the purpose, I will use the Committee’s general 
comments that have been drafted thanks to years of experience in reviewing 
countries reports. This analysis will show that the CESCR’s interpretation of the 
obligations established by article 2(1) is not sensitive enough to the justiciability 
debate and therefore, might not be the most suitable for the adjudication of cases 
under the OP-ICESCR.  
 
b. Article 2(1) of the ICESCR: need of clarification  
Under the Covenant, the obligations of states towards the substantive rights 
enshrined in articles 6 to 15 are stated in part II. Article 2(1) states how governments 
must implement those rights. It reads:  
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, 
individually and through international assistance and co-operation, especially 
economic and technical, to the maximum of its available resources, with a 
view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in 
the present Covenant by all appropriate means, including particularly the 
adoption of legislative measures.263 
 
Much has been said about the ‘elusive and intricate’ meaning of this provision.264 It 
is true that the vagueness of the terms used and the way they are put in relation to 
each other does not allow for a straightforward and clear understanding of states 
obligations. Consequently, since the adoption of the Covenant, the floor has been 
open to different interpretations of the provision, with one main concern: the 
justiciability of ESR. The debate on the justiciability of ESR is about to move 
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forward as the CESCR will have to review individuals and groups complaints as 
provided by the OP-ICESCR. In this context, the question that must be asked is: how 
the CESCR is going to interpret states obligations under the Covenant? A logical 
scenario would be for the Committee to base its judgements on the principles that it 
has developed so far. But is it feasible? Can and should the Committee use those 
standards in the context of an individual complaints mechanism?  
 
In attempting to answer this question, I shall now proceed to the examination of the 
Committee’s understanding of the wordings used in article 2(1). For this purpose, I 
will look at the Committee’s general comments. The Committee first expressed its 
views on the nature of states’ obligations in general comment 3 issued in 1990.265 
The document examined the meaning of article 2(1). In order to develop a 
comprehensible analysis, I will look separately at the different obligations contained 
in the provision. However, it must be bore in mind that they can only be understood 
in relation to each other. 
 
i. ‘to take steps … with a view to achieving progressively the 
full realization of the rights’ 
According to article 2(1), states have the obligation to take steps to achieve 
progressively the full realisation of the rights enshrined in the Covenant.266 In its 
third general comment, the Committee interpreted the obligation to take steps as 
having an immediate effect and thus distinguished it from the obligation to fully 
realise ESCR, which can only be achieved progressively.267 The Committee 
explained that: 
[T]he undertaking … “to take steps” … is not qualified or limited by other 
considerations …. Thus while the full realization of the relevant rights may 
be achieved progressively, steps towards that goal must be taken within a 
reasonably short time after the Covenant's entry into force for the States 
concerned.268 
 
In other words, it means that states must take some immediate actions designed to 
realise the rights progressively. Therefore, states can be in breach of their obligation 
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under article 2(1) if they do not take such steps immediately. This will not be the 
case if they cannot fully realise the rights as this can only be achieved 
progressively.269 
 
The Committee has explained the notion of progressive realisation in the following 
terms: 
The concept of progressive realization constitutes a recognition of the fact 
that full realization of all economic, social and cultural rights will generally 
not be able to be achieved in a short period of time …. It is on the one hand a 
necessary flexibility device, reflecting the realities of the real world and the 
difficulties involved for any country in ensuring full realization of [ESCR]. 
On the other hand, the phrase must be read in the light of the overall 
objective, indeed the raison d'être, of the Covenant which is to establish clear 
obligations for States parties in respect of the full realization of the rights in 
question. It thus imposes an obligation to move as expeditiously and 
effectively as possible towards that goal. Moreover, any deliberately 
retrogressive measures in that regard would require the most careful 
consideration and would need to be fully justified by reference to the totality 
of the rights provided for in the Covenant and in the context of the full use of 
the maximum available resources.270 
 
Therefore, it can be argued that the notion of progressive realisation implies several 
obligations. First, the states must take steps without delay in order to be in 
compliance with the ‘obligation to move as expeditiously and effectively as possible 
towards’271 the realisation of the rights. Secondly, the notion of progressive 
realisation also means that states are obliged to improve socio-economic conditions 
continuously.272 Finally, as the progression has to be continuous, it would be very 
difficult for a government to justify any deliberately retrogressive measures.273 
Therefore, a deliberately retrogressive measure that cannot be justified would be seen 
as a violation of the Covenant. On this subject, the Committee has stated: 
[A] general decline in living and housing conditions, directly attributable to 
policy and legislative decisions by States parties, and in the absence of 
accompanying compensatory measures, would be inconsistent with the 
obligations under the Covenant.274  
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Langford and King found some inconvenient with the Committee’s interpretation of 
the obligation to take steps for the progressive realisation of social rights. They 
argued that the idea that certain obligations are of immediate effect created ‘a 
dichotomy between so-called progressive and immediate obligations, which may 
have the unintended effect of watering down the strength of the Covenant 
obligations’.275 Indeed, classifying obligations in such a way might lead to a 
misconception of states’ responsibilities. States might understand that they do not 
need to take any immediate action for the realisation of an obligation that would have 
been categorised as progressive.276  
 To resolve the risk of an interpretative misunderstanding, one can argue that 
each right entails both immediate and progressive obligation – this becomes maybe 
clearer when one think about the typology of the obligations to respect, protect and 
fulfil human rights. The immediate obligation is to act now in order to achieve a full 
realisation of the rights in a certain period of time. This is valid for all the rights 
enshrined in the Covenant. Therefore, states cannot justify a total inaction on the 
pretext that ESR are subjected to their progressive realisation. According to the 
Committee’s views, states have to adopt legislations as well as plans of action and 
policies for the implementation of the rights, and this must be done as soon as 
possible.277  
 
Another conceptual difficulty of the notion of progressive realisation is stressed by 
Chapman, who explained that, because the Committee has not been able to define 
what the ‘obligation to move as expeditiously and effectively as possible towards’278 
the full realisation of the rights really means, ‘it lacks concrete standards for 
evaluating the performance of governments and their compliance with the 
Covenant’.279 She concluded that it is therefore not surprising that the CESCR ‘does 
not use progressive realization as the standard by which it reviews the performance 
of states parties’.280 
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ii. ‘by all appropriate means, including particularly the adoption 
of legislative measures’ 
Article 2(1) says that the progressive realisation of the rights can be achieved by ‘all 
appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of legislative measures’.281 In 
other words, states enjoy a margin of discretion in deciding which steps they are 
taking, as long as those steps are appropriate.  
 
The Committee recognised that usually legislative measures would be ‘highly 
desirable’ and in some cases, even indispensable.282 It suggested that: 
Such legislation might include: (a) targets or goals to be attained and the time 
frame for their achievement; (b) the means by which the purpose could be 
achieved; (c) the intended collaboration with civil society, the private sector 
and international organizations; (d) institutional responsibility for the process; 
(e) national mechanisms for its monitoring; and (f) remedies and recourse 
procedures.283 
 
However, the CESCR also stressed that the adoption of legislations was ‘by no 
means exhaustive of the obligations of States parties’.284 Depending on the case, 
‘judicial remedies with respect to rights which may, in accordance with the national 
legal system, be considered justiciable’,285 as well as ‘administrative, financial, 
educational and social measures’,286 would also be considered appropriate measures. 
Furthermore, the Committee has stressed many times the importance to develop 
concrete national strategies and policies for the implementation of the rights 
protected by the Covenant.  
 
Although states have a margin of appreciation in choosing appropriate measures, the 
Committee has stressed that it can make ‘the ultimate determination as to whether all 
appropriate measures have been taken’.287 The question is therefore: how the CESCR 
will assess the appropriateness of the means taken by states? In its third general 
comment, it only gave some broad guidelines concerning that issue. It said that the 
‘steps should be deliberate, concrete and targeted as clearly as possible towards 
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meeting the obligations recognized in the Covenant’.288 It further developed a list of 
criteria for coherent policies in its subsequent general comments, putting the 
emphasis on the ‘obligation to adopt a national strategy or plan of action to realize’ 
ESR.289 It started in its first general comment on a specific right that was dedicated to 
the right to adequate housing where it attempted to give guidelines for a coherent 
national housing strategy.290 However, it did not provide clear criteria for the 
assessment of such a plan of action.  
 After few years of experience gained through the review of states reports, the 
Committee has been able to elaborate a clearer list of standards for the evaluation of 
national strategies. It appears in its subsequent general comments on substantive 
rights such as, for example, the right to food and the right to health.291 It has found its 
latest expression in its last general comment on a specific right, namely general 
comment 19 on the right to social security issued in 2008. While recognising that 
states enjoy a margin of discretion in choosing their own approach for the 
implementation of ESR,292 the Committee established a number of criteria that have 
to be fulfilled in the development of any national legislation, strategies and policies. 
The Committee stated that: 
The strategy and action plan should be reasonably conceived in the 
circumstances; take into account the equal rights of men and women and the 
rights of the most disadvantaged and marginalized groups; be based upon 
human rights law and principles; cover all aspects of the right … ; set targets 
or goals to be achieved and the time-frame for their achievement, together 
with corresponding benchmarks and indicators, against which they should be 
continuously monitored; and contain mechanisms for obtaining financial and 
human resources.293 
 
Moreover, the Committee added that ‘the principles of non-discrimination, gender 
equality and people's participation’294 as well as ‘accountability’, ‘transparency’, the 
‘independence of the judiciary and good governance’295 have to be respected in the 
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implementation of a national strategy. 
 
This approach is very similar to the one presented by the Committee in a statement 
issued during the drafting process of the Optional Protocol. The purpose of the 
statement – which is not legally binding – is ‘to clarify how [the CESCR] might 
consider States parties obligations under article 2, paragraph 1, in the context of an 
individual communications procedure’.296 In this document, the Committee 
explained that in considering complaints brought before it, it would assess whether 
the measures taken by the state are ‘adequate’ or ‘reasonable’.297 It stated that in 
doing so, it would consider the following elements:  
(a) The extent to which the measures taken were deliberate, concrete and 
targeted towards the fulfilment of [ESCR];   
(b) Whether the State party exercised its discretion in a non-discriminatory 
and non-arbitrary manner;  
(c) Whether the State party’s decision (not) to allocate available resources 
was in accordance with international human rights standards;  
(d) Where several policy options are available, whether the State party 
adopted the option that least restricts Covenant rights;   
(e) The time frame in which the steps were taken;  
(f) Whether the steps had taken into account the precarious situation of 
disadvantaged and marginalized individuals or groups and, whether they were 
non-discriminatory, and whether they prioritized grave situations or situations 
of risk.298   
 
In addition, the statement stressed that: 
At all times the Committee bears in mind its own role as an international 
treaty body and the role of the State in formulating or adopting, funding and 
implementing laws and policies concerning [ESCR]. To this end, and in 
accordance with the practice of judicial and other quasi-judicial human rights 
treaty bodies, the Committee always respects the margin of appreciation of 
States to take steps and adopt measures most suited to their specific 
circumstances.299 
 
Hence, through its various general comments and its 2007 statement, the Committee 
declared that it would use a reasonableness standard in the review of the 
communications sent under the OP-ICESCR procedure. In addition, it committed 
itself to respect states margin of appreciation in policy decisions. This is also the 
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approach that has been established in the Optional Protocol. Article 8(4) states that 
‘[w]hen examining communications … , the Committee shall consider the 
reasonableness of the steps taken by the State’ and ‘[i]n doing so, the Committee 
shall bear in mind that the State Party may adopt a range of possible policy measures 
for the implementation of the rights set forth in the Covenant’.300 The Committee’s 
interpretation of article 8(4) will play a role of major importance for the whole 
mechanism set out by the Protocol. As Porter pointed out, ‘[w]hether the vision of a 
truly unified approach to human rights that is fully inclusive of claimants affirming 
the right to freedom from want, is actually realised through the Optional Protocol 
will largely depend on how its Article 8(4) is interpreted and applied.’301 
 
Although the CESCR attempted to give some criteria for the assessment of the 
reasonableness of the steps taken, its understanding of the concept still needs to be 
clarified. The real question is how the Committee will use this standard of review in 
practice. It will have to develop its own approach and this will certainly be done in 
the first cases presented before it. The CESCR will most probably use the principles 
enunciated in its general comments as well as in its 2007 statement. It might also find 
it useful to look at the South African Constitutional Court’s model of reasonableness 
review. Langford and King suggested that the obligation to take steps as interpreted 
by the Committee could be compared to the reasonableness standard developed by 
the South African Constitutional Court in socio-economic cases.302 However, in the 
two authors’ view, the Committee’s approach still lacked coherency in comparison 
with the one developed by the Court.303 Similarly, Sepúlveda showed that the 
CESCR assessed the reasonableness of the measures taken by governments in its 
evaluation of states reports. She argued that the Committee needed to clarify this 
standard of review and suggested that, in doing so, it could look at some relevant 
domestic jurisprudence, like for example the South African one.304 
 
                                                
300 OP-ICESCR op cit (n1) art 8 (4). 
301 Porter op cit (n238) 40. 
302 Langford and King op cit (142) 487. 
303 Langford and King op cit (142) 500. 













iii. ‘to the maximum of its available resources’305 
The wording ‘to the maximum of its available resources’ must be understood both as 
an obligation and as a limitation. The obligation lies in the fact that the government 
is obliged to use the maximum of its available resources for the progressive 
realisation of the rights enshrined in the Covenant. The limitation is implied by the 
fact that, in order to achieve this obligation, states cannot go beyond the resources at 
their disposal. However, this does not mean that insufficient or limited resources 
would justify non-action by the states.306 As shown earlier, some steps have to be 
taken immediately, regardless of states’ economic situation.307 Therefore, the 
Committee has emphasised:  
[T]hat even where the available resources are demonstrably inadequate, the 
obligation remains for a State party to strive to ensure the widest possible 
enjoyment of the relevant rights under the prevailing circumstances. 
Moreover, the obligations to monitor the extent of the realization, or more 
especially of the non-realization, of economic, social and cultural rights, and 
to devise strategies and programmes for their promotion, are not in any way 
eliminated as a result of resource constraints.308  
 
The CESCR went further by stating that at any time, no matter the economic 
circumstances, ‘the vulnerable members of society … must be protected by the 
adoption of relatively low-cost targeted programmes.’309 This obligation also applies 
in times of crisis.310 In addition, it is also often acknowledged that all the rights in the 
Covenant have certain dimensions that do not necessitate financial resources to be 
respected.311 The best example might be the case of the right to adequate housing, 
which comprises the right to be protected from forced evictions. As the Committee 
pointed out, ‘the availability of resources will rarely be relevant,’ to justify forced 
evictions.312 
 
Therefore, it can be put forward that states’ discretion in allocating resources is 
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limited. As it has been expressed in the Limburg Principles, ‘[i]n the use of available 
resources due priority shall be given to the realization of rights recognized in the 
Covenant, mindful of the need to assure to everyone the satisfaction of subsistence 
requirements as well as the provision of essential services.’313  
 
Indeed, in the consideration of the states reports, the Committee has sometimes 
indicated that the implementation of social plans should be given priority in the 
context of allocating limited resources.314 Thus, the manner in which governments 
allocate and use resources must be done in compliance with their obligations towards 
the rights enshrined in the Covenant. Sepúlveda explained that this must be done in 
an effective and efficient way, and – as the Committee has stated – this should 
prevent ‘corruption that negatively affects the implementation of the rights’.315 
 
However, in the context of the Optional Protocol, the CESCR might experience some 
problems in measuring whether states comply with the obligation to allocate the 
maximum of their available resources, as this task ‘requires both highly technical 
information and expertise’.316 In reviewing states reports, the Committee has 
developed a number of indicators that could be useful in the context of reviewing 
communications. But this implies that relevant information is provided to the 
Committee.317  
 
c. The obligation to fulfil 
The Committee’s reading of article 2(1) ‘unquestionably imposes binding and 
enforceable obligations on states parties’.318 This is also shown through the 
Committee’s explanation of the tripartite typology of states duties imposed by the 
Covenant.319 For the first time in general comment 12 on the right to adequate food, 
the CESCR declared explicitly that all the rights impose ‘three types or levels of 
obligations on States parties: the obligations to respect, to protect and to fulfil. In 
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turn, the obligation to fulfil incorporates both an obligation to facilitate and an 
obligation to provide.’320 The interpretation of those obligations has to be taken into 
account when one thinks about the adjudication of the complaints under the OP-
ICESCR. According to the Committee, the obligation to respect ‘requires States 
parties not to take any measures that result in preventing’ access to the enjoyment of 
the rights.321 The obligation to protect ‘requires measures by the State to ensure that 
enterprises or individuals do not deprive individuals of their access to’ the enjoyment 
of the rights.322 But most of all, it is the interpretation of the obligation to fulfil that 
might have the greater implication. As Dennis and Stewart have pointed out, the 
obligation to fulfil ‘is by far the most onerous and the most questionable in the light 
of the Covenant’s negotiating history’.323 In the Committee’s words, the obligation to 
fulfil entails an obligation to facilitate, meaning that ‘the State must pro-actively 
engage in activities intended to strengthen people's access to’ the enjoyment of the 
rights. As already mentioned, the obligation to fulfil also implies an obligation to 
provide. Regarding the right to adequate food, the Committee declared that: 
[W]henever an individual or group is unable, for reasons beyond their 
control, to enjoy the right to adequate food by the means at their disposal, 
States have the obligation to fulfil (provide) that right directly. This obligation 
also applies for persons who are victims of natural or other disasters.324 
 
The Committee reiterated this statement in the next general comments on substantive 
rights. Therefore, in the Committee’s understanding of the obligation to fulfil ESR, 
‘as a general rule, States parties are obliged to’ provide food, education, health, water 
and social security to individuals or groups who would be ‘unable, for reasons 
beyond their control, to realize the right themselves by the means at their 
disposal’.325 According to Dennis and Stewart, this is a feature of the Committee’s 
transformative reading of the ICESCR. They argued that ‘[t]hus conceived, the 
Covenant’s obligations are neither aspirational nor discretionary, but have become 
unmistakably mandatory and subject to immediate enforcement in whole or in 
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substantial part.’326 This might become a problem if the Committee relies on its own 
interpretation the obligation to fulfil – and particularly the obligation to provide – in 
reviewing complaints under the Optional Protocol.   
 The obligation to provide is very close to another contentious interpretation 
of the Covenant made by the CESCR: the minimum obligations.  
 
d. Minimum core and minimum obligations 
First of all, I shall start with a brief explanation of what the notion of minimum core 
means, although the literature did not provide for a common definition. Russell 
presented a dominant view when he defined the minimum core of a right as ‘the 
essential element or elements without which a right loses its substantive significance 
as a human right and in the absence of which a State party should be considered to be 
in violation of its international obligations.’327 He added that the concept has also 
been depicted as a ‘“floor” below which conditions should not be permitted to 
fall’.328 In an attempt to give a less abstract definition, Bilchitz pled for the adoption 
of ‘an approach that gives content’ to the rights in placing the ‘interests of the 
individuals at the centre’. 329 He argued that such an approach would recognise ‘that 
[ESR] protect interests of differing degrees of urgency for individuals’. 330 This very 
short presentation of some of the interpretations of the minimum core concept is 
useful at this stage, as the following analysis will show that the Committee did not 
develop a clear definition.  
 
The Committee’s use of the minimum core approach raises several questions that 
cannot be ignored if it has to develop a workable standard of review for the 
implementation of the Optional Protocol.  
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In its third general comment, in addition to the obligations already discussed, the 
Committee identified the separate obligation to ensure the minimum core of the 
rights enshrined in the Covenant.331 It explained: 
[T]hat a minimum core obligation to ensure the satisfaction of, at the very 
least, minimum essential levels of each of the rights is incumbent upon every 
State party. Thus, for example, a State party in which any significant number 
of individuals is deprived of essential foodstuffs, of essential primary health 
care, of basic shelter and housing, or of the most basic forms of education is, 
prima facie, failing to discharge its obligations under the Covenant …. In 
order for a State party to be able to attribute its failure to meet at least its 
minimum core obligations to a lack of available resources it must 
demonstrate that every effort has been made to use all resources that are at its 
disposition in an effort to satisfy, as a matter of priority, those minimum 
obligations.332 
 
At that time – as it is actually still the case – the concept of minimum core did not 
have a clear definition and the Committee’s formulation did not really provide a 
better explanation. General comment 3 only stated that ESR had minimum essential 
levels that amounted to individuals’ basic needs and that states which would fail to 
ensure this minimum would be in breach of their obligations under the Covenant. In 
addition, scarce resources would only justify the non-compliance with those 
obligations if the state can show that everything as been made to use the resources at 
its disposal for the realisation of its minimum obligations. It is also stressed that 
those efforts must have been given priority. Therefore, the CESCR acknowledged 
that in some situations, the failure to guarantee the essential level of a right could be 
justified.  
 
The Committee only started to develop the elements of the minimum core concept 
and the extent of states minimum obligations nine years after general comment 3,333 
in its general comment 12 on the right to food.334 From that stage, it included the 
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notion in all its subsequent general comments on substantive rights.335 Its analysis 
evolved over the years and took different approaches. 336  
 
In general comment 12, the Committee explained that ‘the core content of the right 
to adequate food implies’ that it is available and accessible. 337 While the CESCR 
recalls the principal state obligation towards any ESR, namely ‘to take steps to 
achieve progressively the full realization of the right’, it further declares that ‘[e]very 
State is obliged to ensure for everyone under its jurisdiction access to the minimum 
essential food which is sufficient, nutritionally adequate and safe, to ensure their 
freedom from hunger’.338 This statement creates a new obligation, which is that 
states have to ensure everyone’s access to a sufficient level of food so as to avoid 
situation of hunger. Therefore, if the government cannot guarantee this access, it 
violates its obligation.  
 
Following Young’s typology, the Committee’s formulation of the minimum core in 
general comment 12 could be categorized as an ‘essence approach’, giving priority to 
the ‘“essential” minimum of each right’.339 In this sense, it adopted a ‘needs-based 
core’ analysis, seeing the notion of survival as a determinant.340 This approach failed 
to provide a determinate core to the right because no agreement had been reached on 
how the needs should be assessed341 and on what should be included in the core 
content of each right. Furthermore, in focusing on survival, this approach fails to take 
into account other important aspects of ESR such as the value of human dignity.342 
The result of the exercise was therefore quite abstract.343 The problem with that 
approach is that it obliges states to ensure a minimum whereas this minimum is not 
defined.  
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In an attempt to sidestep the difficulties that it would experience in defining the core 
elements of the rights, the CESCR chose another approach in its subsequent general 
comments. According to Young, the Committee used an obligation approach, which 
‘investigates whether a minimum obligation … can correlate to the minimum 
core’.344 This is illustrated in general comment 13 on the right to education where 
article 13 of the Covenant is literally taken up as it is.345 There is not much to say 
about general comment 13, apart maybe that the fact that all the obligations set forth 
in the article are labelled as minimum obligations is a little bit confusing.  
 
In general comments 12 and 13, the minimum core obligations are not particularly 
detailed and are stated without any qualification,346 meaning that, as explained 
above, they are subjected to the availability of the resources limitation. However, in 
general comment 14 on the right to the highest attainable standard of health, the 
CESCR’s approach shifted in at least two ways.347  
 The first change is that the Committee drew up an extensive and non-
exhaustive list of detailed elements – such as providing essential drugs – which are 
said to be part of the core obligations to the right to health.348 Here two problematic 
aspects of the Committee’s understanding of the minimum core concept as shown 
through its latest general comments must be noted: first, it is too ambitious;349 and 
second, it does not take into account the fact that countries have different levels of 
socio-economic development. While some countries are able to ensure all the aspects 
mentioned without encountering significant problems, others are simply too far from 
it.  
 The second change in the CESCR’s approach is its introduction of non-
derogable obligations. It states that core obligations are non-derogable and therefore, 
resources constraints cannot justify the failure to comply with them.350 In the words 
of the Committee, ‘a State party cannot, under any circumstances whatsoever, justify 
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its non-compliance with the core obligations … which are non-derogable’.351 This 
new approach has been criticised by authors like Dennis and Stewart, who accused 
the Committee of revisionism.352 Indeed, one can question the authority of its experts 
to read the Covenant in such a way as to declare that there are certain obligations, 
which are non-derogable ‘under any circumstances whatsoever’. Although it is 
understandable in the perspective of setting norms for the improvement of ESR, it 
might become a problem in the context of a complaint mechanism. Indeed, if in 
reviewing a communication, the Committee finds that a government – although 
facing resources scarcity – has violated the non-derogable obligation of, for example, 
providing essential drugs, what might be the reaction of the concerned state? It might 
simply deny by arguing that such an obligation does not exist in the Covenant.  
 
In its latest general comment on a substantive right, the Committee took a backward 
step concerning the issue of non-derogable obligations. In general comment 19 on 
the right to social security, there is no mention of non-derogability and the initial 
approach established in general comment 3 is taken up. The Committee reaffirmed 
that: 
In order for a State party to be able to attribute its failure to meet at least its 
minimum core obligations to a lack of available resources, it must demonstrate 
that every effort has been made to use all resources that are at its disposal in an 
effort to satisfy, as a matter of priority, these minimum obligations.353 
 
Until now, the minimum core and the minimum obligation have been quite present in 
the CESCR’s work. However, its approach has not been very convincing. First, it 
was too abstract, as the concept did not find a clear content. Then, the Committee did 
not manage to adopt one clear and consistent way of introducing its view in its 
different general comments. Finally, although the recognition of a minimum core 
obligation to ESR would certainly have positive effects – for example it might help 
identifying situations that should be addressed in priority –, using it as a standard in 
the adjudication of complaints might be very problematic.  
 
Looking at the literature on the subject, it seems that the debate on the definition and 
the content of a minimum core for ESR will not find an issue in a foreseeable future. 
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However, the question is: does the ICESCR really provide for such an obligation? 
Dennis and Stewart contended that in interpreting the Covenant as including the 
minimum core obligation, the Committee adopted a ‘transformatory’ reading of 
article 2(1).354 Then, one can ask oneself how it reached the conclusion that such an 
obligation actually existed. Two reasons can be identified: the Committee suggested 
that first, its experience in the review of the country reports regarding states 
obligations under the Covenant called for it; and second, that if the Covenant was to 
be read without establishing such an obligation, it would lose its ‘raison d’être’.355 
Bilchitz argued that those two reasons were not satisfying and engendered 
‘uncertainty as to the purpose of recognizing a minimum core obligation’.356 Indeed, 
quite surprisingly, the Committee did not base its justification for the recognition of 
the minimum core on arguments related to people’s needs and interests. Even if those 
concerns were certainly in the backdrop of its analysis, the fact that it did not express 
them did not help for a clear understanding of what the minimum core approach 
implied.  
 
It is not clear yet what view the CESCR will adopt once confronted with the review 
of complaints from individuals and groups. But given the positions of the states 
during the discussions leading to the adoption of the Optional Protocol, it appears 
that the Committee might have to review some of its previous statements on states 
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6) The South African Constitutional Court’s jurisprudence on the 
obligations of the state towards ESR as a source of legal interpretation 
for the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
 
a. Introduction 
The previous chapter has identified the reasons explaining why the CESCR’s 
interpretation of states obligations as developed in its general comments might not be 
an appropriate approach in reviewing individual complaints under the OP-ICESCR. 
If they are to be effective, the Committee’s recommendations to the states will have 
to take account of the justiciability concerns outlined in part II. 
 The South African Constitution distances itself from most other national 
constitutions as it recognises ESR as justiciable. This characteristic put the South 
African judgements on ESR under the spotlight. Be it praised or criticised, the South 
African jurisprudence on ESR is almost always taken as an example to show how 
those rights can be adjudicate in practice.  
 In the present chapter, I look at the reasonableness test, which is the standard 
of review developed by the South African Constitutional Court in its ESR 
judgements. I will show how it has been applied in cases dealing with the duty to 
fulfil ESR357. Although the Court is still young – only 15 years old –, the Committee 
might find its experience helpful and even take it as a legal inspiration in its new task 
of reviewing individual complaints. It could therefore assist clarifying the CESCR’s 
own reasonableness standards outlined in its latest general comments and in its 2007 
statement.358 I will then expose the reasons given by the Court for the rejection of the 
minimum core obligation to show that the Committee might have to change its 
approach on this issue in the context of the Optional Protocol. I will conclude by 
stressing how, in adopting a flexible approach, the Court managed to deal with the 
justiciability concerns towards the adjudication of ESR. But first, I will make few 
remarks on ESR in the South African Bill of Rights and on the idea of transformative 
constitutionalism. 
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b. Socio-economic rights in a transformative Constitution 
ESR have been integrated in the South African Bill of Rights after a long 
constitutional negotiating process that culminated with the Constitutional Court 
acting as an ‘independent arbiter’ in Certification of the Constitution of the Republic 
of South Africa (Certification case).359 In this judgement, the Court dismissed 
arguments supporting the non-justiciability of ESR. Rejecting that the inclusion of 
ESR in the Bill of Rights would result ‘in a breach of the separation of powers’,360 
the judges stated that ESR ‘are, at least to some extent, justiciable’ and that ‘[t]he 
fact that ESR will almost inevitably give rise to [budgetary] implications does not 
seem … to be a bar to their justiciability. At the very minimum, socio-economic 
rights can be negatively protected from improper invasion’.361   
 In overruling the objections raised in Certification, the Court closed the debate 
on whether South Africans should benefit from enforceable ESR. However, many 
important questions remained. In particular, how those rights would be adjudicated 
and enforced. The Court gave some answers in its first socio-economic cases, as I 
will show below.  
 
Before turning to that point, I will briefly comment on the concept of ‘transformative 
constitutionalism’, which has been used to describe the nature of the South African 
Constitution.362 This term means that the document has been drafted in the 
perspective of social change.363 ‘Unlike many classic liberal constitutions, its 
primary concern is not to restrain State power, but to facilitate a fundamental change 
in the legacy of injustice produced by over three centuries of colonial and apartheid 
rule.’364 According to Klare, the notion ‘connotes an enterprise of inducing large-
scale social change through nonviolent political process grounded in law’.365  
 The political aspect of the idea of transformative constitutionalism needs to 
be emphasised for its pertinence in helping to understand the Court’s mindset 
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regarding ESR. As Justice Langa has stated, social change implies a ‘transformation 
of the legal culture’ and ‘an acceptance of the politics of law’.366 He also declared 
that ‘[t]here is no longer place for assertions that the law can be kept isolated from 
politics. While they are not the same, they are inherently and necessarily linked’.367  
 The South African Constitution can thus be seen as a legal tool used by 
judges to review political choices, when it is appropriated. Moreover, the courts have 
the duty and the privilege to elaborate a ‘transformative jurisprudence’368. It means 
that they can influence social change through their decisions. 
 
c. Reasonableness test  
The duty to fulfil implies that the state takes measures to realise ESR progressively. 
But this is not the whole story. The measures have to be adequate.369 Therefore, the 
key question asked by the reasonableness review is whether the steps taken by the 
state are reasonably capable of realising ESR progressively.370 This is a test has been 
elaborated to assess policies or legislative decisions against ESR.371 In the space of 
less than two years, it has become South African Constitutional Court’s favourite 
model of review for the adjudication of ESR cases. The Court specified that it ‘must 
be determined on the facts of each case’.372 It has been established in Grootboom373 – 
dealing with ‘the right to have access to adequate housing’ enshrined in section 26 of 
the Constitution374 – and has been taken up and developed in the following ESR 
                                                
366 Langa op cit (n362) 353. 
367 Ibid. 
368 W Forbath The ‘transformative’ constitution and the politics of social rights in South Africa (2008) 
4. 
369 Brand op cit (n357) 220. 
370 S Liebenberg ‘South Africa: Adjudicating Social Rights Under a Transformative Constitution’ in 
Malcolm Langford (ed) Social Rights Jurisprudence: Emerging Trends in International and 
Comparative Law (2008) 83; Liebenberg op cit (n364) 3. 
371 Brand op cit (n357) 220. 
372 Grootboom supra (n241) para 92. 
373 Grootboom supra (n241). 
374 Section 26 of the South African Constitution reads: 
‘(1) Everyone has the right to have access to adequate housing. 
(2) The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available 
resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of this right. 
(3) No one may be evicted from their home, or have their home demolished, without an order 














landmark cases such as Minister of Health v. Treatment Action Campaign (TAC)375 
and Khosa v Minister of Social Development; Mahlaule v Minister of Social 
Development (Khosa)376 – dealing with the ‘the right to have access to health care 
services’ and ‘the right to have access to social security’ respectively, both enshrined 
in section 27 of the Constitution.377 
 
In Grootboom, after having exposed how ‘the right to have access to adequate 
housing’,378 as stated in subsection 26(1), should be understood and addressed in the 
South African context,379 the judge came to the analysis of subsection 26(2), which 
‘speaks to the positive obligation imposed upon the state’.380 It understood this 
obligation as requiring ‘the state to devise a comprehensive and workable plan to 
meet its obligations’. But it added that ‘subsection (2) also makes it clear that the 
obligation imposed upon the state is not an absolute or unqualified one’ as it is 
defined by ‘three key elements’.381 Those elements are precisely what form the 
internal limitation clause. Given that the obligation of the state is one to ‘take 
reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to achieve 
the progressive realisation’ of the right,382 the reasonableness standard review must 
therefore encompass those elements.383  
 
i. Reasonable legislative and other measures 
In Grootboom, The Court considered the element of ‘reasonable legislative and other 
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measures’ and stated that ‘[a] reasonable programme … must clearly allocate 
responsibilities and tasks to the different spheres of government and ensure that the 
appropriate financial and human resources are available’.384 Such a programme must 
be coordinated, comprehensive, coherent and ‘directed towards the progressive 
realisation of the right of access to adequate housing within the state’s available 
means’.385 The Court went on by giving some indications on how the measures 
should be evaluated, taking into account the doctrine of the separation of powers. 
The judgement reads: 
The precise contours and content of the measures to be adopted are primarily a 
matter for the legislature and the executive. They must, however, ensure that 
the measures they adopt are reasonable. In any challenge based on section 26 in 
which it is argued that the state has failed to meet the positive obligations 
imposed upon it by section 26(2), the question will be whether the legislative 
and other measures taken by the state are reasonable. A court considering 
reasonableness will not enquire whether other more desirable or favourable 
measures could have been adopted, or whether public money could have been 
better spent. The question would be whether the measures that have been 
adopted are reasonable. It is necessary to recognise that a wide range of 
possible measures could be adopted by the state to meet its obligations. Many 
of these would meet the requirement of reasonableness. Once it is shown that 
the measures do so, this requirement is met.386 
 
In this passage, the Court set out the basis of the reasonableness review: the state 
enjoys a broad margin of discretion in its policy choices, as long as the measures 
chosen are reasonable.387 But legislative measures alone are not sufficient. They 
must be ‘supported by appropriate, well-directed policies and programmes … 
reasonable both in their conception and their implementation’.388 The Court 
continued explaining that: 
In determining whether a set of measures is reasonable, it will be necessary to 
consider housing problems in their social, economic and historical context and 
to consider the capacity of institutions responsible for implementing the 
programme. The programme must be balanced and flexible and make 
appropriate provision for attention to housing crises and to short, medium and 
long term needs. A programme that excludes a significant segment of society 
cannot be said to be reasonable.389  
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The Court concluded its analysis of the reasonableness of the measures by adding 
that such an evaluation had to ‘be understood in the context of the Bill of Rights as a 
whole’.390 Relying on the South African constitutional founding values of human 
dignity, freedom and equality, the Court declared:  
Those whose needs are the most urgent … must not be ignored by the measures 
aimed at achieving realisation of the right. It may not be sufficient to meet the 
test of reasonableness to show that the measures are capable of achieving a 
statistical advance in the realisation of the right. Furthermore, the Constitution 
requires that everyone must be treated with care and concern. If the measures, 
though statistically successful, fail to respond to the needs of those most 
desperate, they may not pass the test.391  
 
As Liebenberg noted, the condition that ‘a reasonable government programme must 
cater for those in urgent need’ is ‘[t]he element of the reasonableness test that comes 
closest to a threshold requirement’,392 meaning that it could be a decisive factor. 
Wesson went even further by arguing that Grootboom can only be understood fully 
through this element. The ratio of the judgement he stated, is that governmental 
programmes ‘should not exclude a “significant sector of society” … [that] cannot be 
expected to meet [its] socio-economic needs independently, on the basis of [its] own 
resources’.393  This would be what led the Court to the ‘finding that those whose 
needs are most basic should not be excluded – in the sense of not being specifically, 
or adequately, catered for – from the state’s housing program’.394 
 Therefore, in Grootboom, on the basis of this element, the Court held that – 
although rational and comprehensive in many respect – the housing ‘programmes 
adopted by the state fell short of the requirements of section 26(2) in that no 
provision was made for relief to the categories of people in desperate need’.395 
 
The justification for this requirement is to be found in the interpretation of the value 
of human dignity.396 In Grootboom, the Court pointed out that section 26 was not the 
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only relevant provision that had to be taken into account in the reasonableness test.397 
It explained that it was ‘fundamental to an evaluation of the reasonableness of state 
action that account be taken of the inherent dignity of human beings’ and added that 
this was the backdrop against which state’s conduct towards the Grootboom 
community should be seen.398 Thus, through this judgement, the Court affirmed the 
significance of the value of human dignity in any assessment of the reasonableness 
of state’s actions.399 
 
Those few passages of Grootboom established the foundations of the reasonableness 
review. The Constitutional Court took up this analysis in TAC, where it added the 
requirement of transparency. It stated that ‘a concerted, co-ordinated and co-
operative national’ health plan to face HIV/AIDS challenges ‘can be achieved only if 
there is proper communication, especially by government’ and that for such a 
programme ‘to meet the constitutional requirement of reasonableness, its contents 
must be made known appropriately.’400 
 
An additional element of the reasonableness test can be found in Khosa, where the 
Court declared that the ‘denial of access to social grants to permanent residents’ 
amounted to unfair discrimination and therefore did ‘not constitute a reasonable 
legislative measure’.401 Unfair discrimination can thus be considered as a factor that 
has to be included in the reasonableness test. 402  
 
To summarise, the criteria established by the South African Constitutional Court to 
evaluate the reasonableness of the measures taken by the government towards ESR 
can be outlined as follows: 
• ‘The programme must be comprehensive, coherent, coordinated’; 
• ‘Appropriate financial and human resources must be made available’; 
• ‘It must be balanced and flexible and make appropriate provision for short, 
medium and long-term needs’ and ‘must respond to the extreme levels of 
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deprivation of people in desperate situations’; 
• ‘It must be reasonably conceived and implemented’; and 
• ‘It must be transparent, and its contents must be made known effectively to the 
public.’403 
• The measures taken by the state must not amount to unfair discrimination.404   
 
The Court drew most of its analysis of the reasonableness on the measures taken by 
the state. But the two other elements found in the internal limitation clause – namely 
the ‘progressive realisation’ of the right and the ‘availability of the resources’ – are 
also influencing the assessment.405 This is in line with the Court’s interpretation that 
the positive obligations of the state are both defined and limited by subsections 26(2) 
and 27(2).406 While those provisions require the state to take reasonable measures, 
they also make ‘it clear that the obligation imposed upon the state is not an absolute 
or unqualified one’.407 Therefore, while both the notions of ‘progressive realisation’ 
and ‘availability of the resources’ can justify a governmental failure to ensure access 
to ESR, ‘they can also support a finding of unreasonable acts or omissions by the 
State.’408 
 
ii. Progressive realisation of the right 
In Soobramoney v Minister of Health (Kwazulu-Natal) (Soobramoney)409 – the first 
case concerning a social right presented before it – the Court had already expressed 
its views on the progressive realisation of ESR when it stated that, through the 
wording of subsections 26(2) and 27(2), ‘the Constitution accepts that it cannot solve 
all of [South African] society’s woes overnight, but must go on trying to resolve 
these problems’.410 
 
In Grootboom, the Court attempted to give a more elaborated explanation. It 
explained that according to section 26, ‘what must be achieved’ by the government is 
the progressive realisation of the right of adequate housing, because an immediate 
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realisation is impossible.411 As the next passage shows, the Court considered that the 
constitutional goal regarding ESR is that everyone enjoys his or her basic needs, and 
consequently, this is what has to be progressively realised. The judgement reads:  
The term “progressive realisation” shows that it was contemplated that the 
right could not be realised immediately. But the goal of the Constitution is 
that the basic needs of all in our society be effectively met and the 
requirement of progressive realisation means that the state must take steps to 
achieve this goal. It means that accessibility should be progressively 
facilitated: legal, administrative, operational and financial hurdles should be 
examined and, where possible, lowered over time.412 
 
It means that – taking the other factors into account – to be reasonable, the measures 
taken by the state would have to serve the progressive realisation of the right in 
question. Moreover, the Court endorsed the CESCR’s interpretation of the 
requirement of progressive realisation contained in general comment 3.413  
 
iii. Within available resources 
The Court’s views on the question of resources availability in relation to the right to 
health care of a single individual as expressed in Soobramoney shows well that 
budgetary constraints imply governmental choices and prioritisation in the allocation 
of resources. The Court estimated that given the many socio-economic claims the 
state has to address with its limited resources, ‘[t]here will be times when this [will 
require] it to adopt a holistic approach to the larger needs of society rather than to 
focus on the specific needs of particular individuals within society’.414  
 
In Grootboom, the Court stressed the importance of the resources criteria in 
evaluating governmental actions regarding socio-economic issues because it could 
not be asked to the state to ‘do more than its available resources permit’.415 It went 
on saying that ‘both the content of the obligation in relation to the rate at which it is 
achieved as well as the reasonableness of the measures employed to achieve the 
result are governed by the availability of resources’.416 The judgment then quoted 
Soobramoney, where the Court stated that ‘[g]iven [the] lack of resources and the 
                                                
411 Grootboom supra (n241) para 45. 
412 Ibid. 
413 CESCR General Comment 3 op cit (n265) para 9. 
414 Soobramoney supra (n409) para 31. 
415 Grootboom supra (n241) para 46. 













significant demands on them … , an unqualified obligation to meet [access to 
housing, health care, food, water, and social security] would not presently be capable 
of being fulfilled’.417 
 In the Court’s perspective, goals and means must be balanced. Therefore 
reasonable measures will have to be designed to reach the goal expeditiously and 
effectively while taking the availability of the resources into account.418  
 
The difficulty lying in the resources availability factor implies that the Court assesses 
whether the state has the necessary resources to enforce one right or another. In 
practice, the Court has had a tendency to avoid going deeply into budgetary issues. In 
general, the judges accepted the arguments given by the state for its choices in 
allocating resources, without really questioning them.419 Two exceptions can 
however be found in TAC and Khosa, where the Court was forced to tackle the issue. 
In TAC, the Court rejected state’s argument that it did not have sufficient resources 
to extend its programme to facilities other than the pilot sites on the grounds that 
first, it showed a lack of political will rather than a lack of resources and second, 
because the resources needed became actually available.420 In Khosa, after having 
considered all the elements put before it, the Court dismissed the argument of the 
state that it did not have sufficient financial means to provide social assistance grants 
to permanent residents by pointing out that ‘even at the most pessimistic estimate of 
the additional cost occasional burden on the state would in relative terms be very 
small’.421 
 
The Court’s general cautious approach towards budgetary issues is well summarised 
by the following passage from TAC: 
Courts are ill-suited to adjudicate upon issues where court orders could have 
multiple social and economic consequences for the community. The 
Constitution contemplates rather a restrained and focused role for the courts, 
namely, to require the state to take measures to meet its constitutional 
obligations and to subject the reasonableness of these measures to evaluation.  
Such determinations of reasonableness may in fact have budgetary 
implications, but are not in themselves directed at rearranging budgets. In this 
way the judicial, legislative and executive functions achieve appropriate 
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constitutional balance.422  
 
In other words, while the judiciary will not directly question governmental choices 
about resources allocation, its task of assessing the reasonableness of state’s conduct 
might lead to decisions that would oblige the state to rearrange its budget.423 
 
d. Rejection of the minimum core approach  
As shown in the previous chapter, the minimum core concept is an important 
component of the CESCR’s interpretation of states obligations towards ESR. 
Although such an approach is justified on the grounds that it gives content to ESR, it 
can become quite problematic when faced with justiciability concerns. The South 
African Constitutional Court has identified those limits from the outset of its ESR 
jurisprudence. This led the judges to reject the minimum core concept. The reasons 
for this rejection have been given in Grootboom and in TAC, where the amici curiae 
invoked the minimum core notion in their heads of arguments. This was done in an 
attempt to give substance to the rights of access to housing and access to health care 
respectively.  
 
In Grootboom, the amici curiae424 suggested ‘that the proper approach’ to evaluate if 
the state was in breach of an obligation to provide shelter to people living in dire 
circumstances was ‘to determine the content of the relevant rights in the 
Constitution’.425 They stated that ‘the needs of vulnerable members of society, and 
social groups living in unfavourable conditions’ must be prioritized according to the 
notion of minimum core and that ‘[t]here is an obligation to provide for the core of 
immediate absolutely basic human needs’.426  
 
The arguments of the amici curiae427 in TAC were more developed. They stated that a 
proper reading of subsections 27(1) and (2) ‘creates free-standing individual rights 
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on the one hand and imposes positive duties on the state towards fulfilment of those 
rights on the other’.428 Thus, sections 26 and 27 would contain two different state 
obligations: an obligation to give effect to the rights enshrined in subsections 26(1) 
and 27(1), and a limited obligation to realise those rights progressively, through 
reasonable measures and within available resources.429 Then, the amici curiae 
contended that ‘all the [ESR] entrenched in ss 26(1) and 27(1), are in the first place 
directed at the achievement of the value of human dignity’.430 What follows – in the 
amici curiae’s view – is that ‘[t]he individual constitutional right created by 
s 27(1)(a) and enforceable against the state under s 7(2), accordingly at least includes 
a right of access to a minimum core of health care services comprising the minimum 
necessary for dignified human existence.’431 
 
In both cases, the Court rejected those arguments on different grounds. First, it 
explained that it did not have sufficient information to determine the minimum core 
concept given the diversity of social needs.432 In addition, it noted that it was difficult 
to determine ‘whether the minimum core obligation should be defined generally or 
with regard to specific groups of people’.433 However, it acknowledged that there 
might be cases where it would ‘be possible and appropriate to have regard to the 
content of a minimum core obligation to determine whether the measures taken by 
the state are reasonable’, provided that enough information is given to the Court.434 
 Here, the Court pointed out one of the problems raised in the previous 
chapter, namely the difficulty to define clearly the elements of a minimum core of a 
right. This is not a difficulty that only applies to the South African courts. The Court 
stated that, contrary to itself, the CESCR managed to gather enough information to 
develop the concept.435 I actually disagree with that statement as the reading of the 
Committee’s general comments clearly shows some confusion towards the definition 
of the concept. In fact, the CESCR has not been able to build a comprehensible 
approach regarding the minimum core idea and that is one of the reasons why it 
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should not be applied in the review of individual communications under the OP-
ICESCR.  
 
Secondly, in TAC, the Court did not agree with the amici curiae’s reading of sections 
26 and 27 because it would suggest ‘that the content of the right in subsection (1) 
differs from the content of the obligation in subsection (2)’.436 It argued that the 
sections have to be read together and therefore do not create separate obligations.437 
Recalling Grootboom’s conclusion, it stated that: 
[T]he [ESR] of the Constitution should not be construed as entitling everyone 
to demand that the minimum core be provided to them. Minimum core was 
thus treated as possibly being relevant to reasonableness under section 26(2), 
and not as a self-standing right conferred on everyone under section 26(1).438 
 
I agree with the Court that subsections (1) and (2) should be read together and that 
they both speak about the same right. However, I do not think that this is an 
argument that could actually dismiss the notion of minimum core. I suggest that the 
Court’s interpretation of the link between the two subsections allows for the adoption 
of the minimum core concept because nothing prevents the right in question to 
comprise some essential elements. The question is elsewhere, in particular: how 
those elements would be defined? 
 
Thirdly, the Court considered that the immediacy imposed by minimum core 
obligations would create unrealistic duties on the government.439 It argued that given 
the fact that resources constraints prevent the state to do more than it can achieve, 
individuals are not entitled to claim for an immediate fulfilment of their rights.440 The 
Court made it clear: ‘[i]t is impossible to give everyone access even to a “core” 
service immediately. All that is possible, and all that can be expected of the state, is 
that it act[s] reasonably to provide access to the [ESR] on a progressive basis.’441  
 Here the Court tackled another major problem raised by the minimum core 
idea. In the context of Optional Protocol, it would be very difficult to convince states 
to comply to minimum obligations if they have to be in effect immediately. It is not 
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to contest the legitimacy such obligations would have in the reality. Here, I am 
discussing its real applicability and its acceptance by the states. If it is clear that a 
majority of countries would not be able to comply with such immediate obligations, 
the Committee might not want to include them as standards for the review of the 
communications under the OP-ICESCR.  
 
The fourth reason given by the Court to explain its unwillingness to adopt the 
minimum core approach was based on its incompatibility with the institutional 
competencies and the role of the judiciary.442 It declared that ‘the courts are not 
institutionally equipped to make the wide-ranging factual and political enquiries 
necessary for determining what the minimum-core standards … should be, nor for 
deciding how public revenues should most effectively be spent’.443 Advocating for a 
balanced relationship between the three spheres of the state, it advanced that the 
courts should only ‘require the state to take measures to meet its constitutional 
obligations and … subject the reasonableness of these measures to evaluation’.444 
 With this last argument, the Court linked the issue of the minimum core with 
one of the main justiciability concerns. By implying that adopting the minimum core 
approach might threaten the doctrine of the separation of powers, the Court chose to 
respect the traditional limits of the role of the judiciary. This deference to the 
government has been widely criticised, especially in the very unequal socio-
economic South African context and given the transformative role of the 
Constitution.  
 
It must be noted that the Court looked briefly into the question of the minimum core 
of ESR in the recent case of Mazibuko v City of Johannesburg445 related to the right 
to access sufficient water enshrined in section 27, where the applicants suggested 
that 50 litres of water per person per day was the necessary amount for a dignified 
life.446 Without basing their argument on the minimum core concept, they contended 
‘that the Court should adopt a quantified standard determining the content of the 
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right’ to access sufficient water.447 The Court dismissed the applicants’ request, 
declaring that the ‘argument must fail for the same reasons that the minimum core 
argument failed in Grootboom and [TAC]’.448 
 
The Court’s rejection of the minimum core approach has been criticised on the basis 
that it fails to give content to ESR.449 Those critics deplore the reasonableness review 
used by South African judges for the same reason: according to them, it is too 
abstract.450 From a pure human rights perspective, those concerns are legitimate. It is 
true that the reasonableness test is focused on the measures adopted by the states 
rather than on the rights per se, and thus, the interests of vulnerable groups might 
seem to be pushed into the background.451 But from a realist perspective, like the one 
that should be adopted in ESR adjudication at national as well as at international 
level, the South African Constitutional Court’s position towards the minimum core 
concept seems to me to be justifiable because of its sensitivity to justiciability 
concerns.  
 
e. A cautious, flexible and realistic approach taking account of the 
justiciability concerns   
In adopting the model that has been outlined, the South African Constitutional Court 
managed to deal with some of the concerns identified in part II. First, instead of 
focusing its review on the circumstances of an individual (the plaintiff), the Court 
concentrated on the elements of state programmes.452 This allowed getting round the 
polycentricity problem discussed earlier. As Christiansen explained:  
The Court’s approach helps to avoid piecemeal and serial litigation regarding 
similar circumstances and also allows the Court to request improvement of 
government programs even if there is no appropriate individual remedy. 
Moreover, applying a flexible reasonableness standard to government 
programs allows more judicial discretion to broadly investigate the failings of 
the program, even if particular faults are not directly related to the plaintiff.453 
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However, as already pointed out, this feature of the Court’s jurisprudence has been 
criticised for its lack of sensitivity towards individuals’ needs. It is true that in 
tackling the problem from the perspective of national plans and policies, the Court 
does not really show the intent to put human rights at the centre of its work. But, one 
might contend that, in declaring that state’s actions are unreasonable and therefore 
unconstitutional when they fail to take account of the situation of people living in 
desperate need, the Court demonstrated that human rights and social justice 
principles can actually be integrated in its model of review.454 This shows the 
flexibility of the reasonableness test, as it has the potential to incorporate different 
elements according to the specificity of the case. 
 
Secondly, the reading of the Court’s judgments – especially Grootboom and TAC – 
shows that the judges took the information problem as a serious limit to their ability 
to define the content of a right and particularly its minimum core.455 A limit the 
CESCR had never explicitly recognised, but will probably have to concede. There is 
particularly one aspect of the Court’s strategy to deal with the information challenge 
that might be very useful to adopt in the context of the Optional Protocol. If – like 
the Court did – the Committee places ‘the burden of proof upon the government 
when it claims a lack of available resources’, this will address ‘the information 
problem by requiring the state, the only party with that particular (and critical) 
information, to present it to the [Committee] in order to justify its arguments’.456 This 
would also relieve the plaintiff of providing information he or she would certainly 
not be able to obtain.  
 
Thirdly, the Court also paid attention to the boundary between law and politics when 
confronted to the remedy issue as it showed deference to the legislature.457 Although 
the remedy aspect of the adjudication process is not the focus of this work, it is 
interesting to note that the Court favoured to give guidelines on how a programme 
should be conducted rather than to order specific actions.458    
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For those reasons, the South African Constitutional Court’s approach in ESR cases 
has been correctly qualified as being cautious and realistic.459 It shows the 
willingness ‘to take account of the variety of cases … and of the different extent to 
which [it] is constrained by its incapacity and illegitimacy in each different case’.460 
As Christiansen explained, ‘the unique but adaptable manner in which the Court’s 
social rights jurisprudence accommodates classic non-justiciability arguments … 
advances social justice within South Africa and creates an exportable model of social 
rights enforcement’.461 
 As outlined in this chapter, this appears clearly when one looks at the 
application of the standards of review in the ESR landmark cases. The Court’s 
method of review has showed a great flexibility and the possibility to be applied on a 
case-by-case basis.462 The choice of the reasonableness test and the rejection of the 
minimum core obligation allowed the Court to find a middle ground between the 
different camps of the justiciability debate – although they might not acknowledge it. 
The Court’s jurisprudence ‘is less radical’ in the sense that it is ‘less a departure from 
the standard concerns regarding the justiciability of [ESR]’, and yet it ‘is also more 
radical because, by demonstrating a viable model of social rights adjudication that 
incorporates the concerns of its detractors in a substantive manner, the South African 
jurisprudence more explicitly challenges their broadly held non-justiciability 
viewpoints.463 
 
It is this balancing approach between enforcement of ESR and respect of state’s 
political affairs464 – or between ‘judicial vigilance and deference’465 – that created the 
exportable potential of South African jurisprudence.466 And this is precisely what 
could inspire the CESCR when reviewing communications under the OP-ICESCR. 
In imposing to itself some limitations that allow it to internalise the elements of the 
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justiciability discussion,467 the Court developed a model that could be taken as an 
example by the Committee. One of the greatest challenges the CESCR will have to 
face when confronting to the assessment of the complaints is precisely how to deal 
with the justiciability concerns. Those concerns are to be taken seriously by the 
experts if the new procedure has to impact positively on ESR violations in member 
states. This is even truer when one thinks about the quasi-judiciary and international 
nature of the Committee, as this leads some sceptic states to question the legitimacy 
of the body in reviewing domestic socio-economic policies. 
 
My proposition is not that the Committee should adopt the South African approach 
with complete confidence, without criticising or developing its own characteristics. 
What I am suggesting is that it takes account of this useful practical experience for 
crafting its own jurisprudence that would, consequently, be more sensitive to the 
justiciability of ESR concerns.  
 Moreover, I believe that the model developed by the South African judges 
shows a greater potential to take account of states’ realism – in the meaning of the 
theory of international relations –, than the approach set out in the CESCR’s general 
comments. Being sensitive to realistic governmental interests, without giving up on 
the human rights principles, might be profitable for the Committee if the procedure 
put in place by the Optional Protocol is to have a positive impact on the ground. 
 However, I can only agree with Liebenberg when she states that the 
reasonableness model could gain in substance if greater attention was given to ‘the 
purposes and values which [ESR] are intended to promote’.468 Without being 
constrained by the rigidity of the minimum core approach, this could counterbalance 
the fact that the reasonableness standard – as developed so far – does not always 
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In this work, I have shown that the OP-ICESCR creates a new framework in which 
the Committee will have to develop new ways of interpreting states obligations. The 
CESCR’s position towards certain aspect of the obligations of the states – for 
example the minimum core obligation – might not be flexible enough to be 
acceptable by states parties. I have explained that if it is to be effective, the 
Committee’s assessment of individual complaints has to take into consideration some 
of the justiciability concerns. Although the Committee’s point of view is usually 
absolutely understandable from a pure human rights perspective, it entails the risk 
that states will simply reject it for its lack of sensitivity towards realistic interests.  
 In this paper, I have tried to answer to this problem by looking into the South 
African jurisprudence on ESR. I have pointed out the main aspects of the 
reasonableness standard of review, as well as the reasons for South African judges’ 
rejection of the minimum core approach. This analysis has confirmed that, although 
still young, the South African jurisprudence on ESR is a rich source of interpretation. 
It is flexible, balanced, realist, exportable and has the potential to take account of 
human rights on one hand, and political interests on the other. I have suggested that 
in paying attention to those jurisprudential developments, the Committee could be 
better equipped to examine complaints of alleged ESR violations in the – very realist 
– environment of the United Nations.  
 The subject of this paper is resolutely contemporary. The members of the 
CESCR are certainly asking themselves some of the questions that have been 
discussed here. However, one might have to wait some time before witnessing the 
real implementation of the OP-ICESCR. The text will only enter into force when ten 
states parties to the Covenant will have ratified or accessed to it.469 South Africa has 
maybe paved the way for interpreting states obligations towards ESR, but it seems 
unlikely that it will be part of the first states to ratify the Optional Protocol. The 
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